There isn't much one can do about it if you want to preserve your values.

I dispute the assumption that my emotions represent my values. Since the part of me that has to construct a utility function (let's say for the purpose of building an FAI) is the deliberative thinking part, why shouldn't I (i.e., that part of me) dis-identify with my emotional side? Suppose I do, then there's no reason for me to rationalize "my" emotions (since I view them as just the emotions of a bunch of neurons that happen to be attached to me). Instead, I could try to figure out from abstract reasoning alone what I should value (falling back to nihilism if ultimately needed).

According to anti-realism, this is just as valid a method of coming up with a normative theory as any other (that somebody might have the psychological disposition to choose), right?

Alternatively, what if I think the above may be something I should do, but I'm not sure? Does anti-realism offer any help besides that it's "just a meta moral judgment and people will have different answers because the answer depends on their psychological disposition"?

A superintelligent moral psychologist might tell me that there is one text file, which if I were to read it, would cause me to do what I described earlier, and another text file which would cause me to to choose to rationalize my emotions instead, and therefore I can't really be said to have an intrinsic psychological disposition in this matter. What does anti-realism say is my morality in that case?