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DaFranker comments on A Sketch of an Anti-Realist Metaethics - Less Wrong
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The post heavily relies on moral internalism without arguing for it. Internalism holds that a necessary connection exists between sincere moral judgment and motivation. As the post says, "moral statements [...] seem to be self-motivating." I've never seen a deeply plausible argument for internalism, and I'm pretty sure it's false. The ability of many psychopaths to use moral language in a normal way, and in some cases to agree that they've done evil and assert that they just don't care, would seem to refute it.
Upvoted for giving a clear statement of an anti-realist view.
If we all agree that some different moral statements are motivating in different amounts, the burden of proof is on the one who says that a certain amount of motivation is impossible.
E.g. The belief "It would be nice to help a friend by helping carry their couch up the stairs to their apartment" makes me feel mildly inclined to help. The belief "It would be really nice to give the homeless guy who asked for food a sandwich" makes me significantly inclined to help. Why would it be impossible for me to believe "It would be nice to help my friend with his diet when he visits me" and feel nothing at all?