Pardon me for saying this in capitals, but this thread is full of people getting it wrong.
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION DOES NOT SAY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS COLLAPSES THE WAVEFUNCTION.
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION DOES NOT SAY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS COLLAPSES THE WAVEFUNCTION.
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION DOES NOT SAY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS COLLAPSES THE WAVEFUNCTION.
At least, not in the sense that everyone is assuming, according to which the wavefunction is a real thing.
In the Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction is not a physical entity. It has the same sort of ontological status as a probability distribution. It is not itself a probability distribution, but it is the mathematical object from which probability distributions are derived. And it also has this in common with probability distributions, that when new information about the world is obtained, you have to update it. This is the only sense in which "consciousness collapses the wavefunction" in the Copenhagen interpretation.
In the Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction is not a physical entity. It has the same sort of ontological status as a probability distribution. It is not itself a probability distribution, but it is the mathematical object from which probability distributions are derived. And it also has this in common with probability distributions, that when new information about the world is obtained, you have to update it.
It sounds like you're saying the wavefunction represents our uncertainty. My impression is that you know more about grand theories of phys...
Suppose you believe in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schroedinger puts his cat in a box, with a device that has a 50% chance of releasing a deathly poisonous gas. He will then open the box, and observe a live or dead cat, collapsing that waveform.
But Schroedinger's cat is lazy, and spends most of its time sleeping. Schroedinger is a pessimist, or else an optimist who hates cats; and so he mistakes a sleeping cat for a dead cat with probability P(M) > 0, but never mistakes a dead cat for a living cat.
So if the cat is dead with probability P(D) >= .5, Schroedinger observes a dead cat with probability P(D) + P(M)(1-P(D)).
If observing a dead cat causes the waveform to collapse such that the cat is dead, then P(D) = P(D) + P(M)(1-P(D)). This is possible only if P(D) = 1.
If you don't say that only conscious agents can collapse waveforms, then you have to agree that something in the box collapses the waveform as seen from inside the box, while it's still uncollapsed to Schroedinger. And Schroedinger's opening the box collapses that waveform for him; but it is still uncollapsed for someone outside the room. This seems like it might be equivalent to many worlds - all possibilities already exist; you just haven't chosen which one you're going to access until you open the box.
But if you do say that only conscious agents can collapse waveforms, then it's something about their mental processes that does the collapsing. This could mean their beliefs matter. And then, the cat is always dead.
ADDED: People. Read the entire post before responding. I am not claiming that the cat is always dead. I am not claiming that consciousness collapses waveforms. I am claiming that there are only 2 known alternatives:
If you can't produce another alternative, and you don't believe in many-worlds, you owe me an upvote.
Finally, this post is supposed to be fun! You are crushing all whimsy and playfulness on LessWrong when you pile downvotes like bricks on anything playful because it does not provide a complete and satisfactory resolution.