PhilGoetz comments on Is That Your True Rejection? by Eliezer Yudkowsky @ Cato Unbound - Less Wrong

30 Post author: XiXiDu 07 September 2011 06:27PM

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Comment author: Matt_Simpson 07 September 2011 09:11:23PM *  18 points [-]

From the beginning of Eliezer's piece

I think my libertarianism rests chiefly on the empirical proposition—a factual belief which is either false or true, depending on how the universe actually works—that 90% of the time you have a bright idea like “offer government mortgage guarantees so that more people can own houses,” someone will somehow manage to screw it up, or there’ll be side effects you didn’t think about, and most of the time you’ll end up doing more harm than good, and the next time won’t be much different from the last time.

I think there's an interesting congitive phenomenon going on here. If you tell the average Joe that you propose to deregulate some industry or activity, they easily call to mind the potential negative consequences - "they'll just pollute as much as they want now" or "only the biggest companies will buy up the fishing quotas" etc. What the average Joe doesn't think about are the potential negative effects of regulation - unintended consequences and regulatory capture for example. Regulatory capture is a sort of funny case because though the concept was invented by a Marxist (if memory serves), only economists and libertarians seem to think about it. When the average Joe does recognize these shortcomings, they virtually always get to designing a "better" law, agency, and/or policy. For evidence, I offer r/politics, though there's an admittedly liberal slant there (relative to the population).

I'm not sure what is causing this bias or even how to categorize it, but it seems related to how most people respond to the broken window fallacy. Some effects are "seen" and others "unseen", or rather more easily seen and less easily seen (which correspond to something like direct effects and indirect effects), and the average person is much better at anticipating "seen" effects. Something like this is going on in the political case - at least in terms of unintended consequences, but that's not all of it. Regulatory capture occurs, in part, because people in the government are no more or less corrupt than people outside of the government. Most people are quick to suspect private companies of being corrupt, but never a new regulatory agency to reign in that private company. The solution to a government failure is always government. Rarely does the average Joe even ask the question "is the government even good at doing this sort of thing?" At least at the surface level, this looks nothing like "seen" and "unseen." I'm not entirely sure what's going on here, but I suspect figuring it out will help explain political preferences.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 07 September 2011 11:52:44PM *  2 points [-]

The impulse to regulate derives from the human tendency to live in hierarchical societies, such as monarchies. It's been a long time since we developed governments other than monarchies, that work by assuming people are corrupt and constructing a system that makes it unlikely for anyone to be especially oppressed. But our instinct is always to forget that is how our government works, and think our problems can be solved by getting the right person as president, CEO, or whatever.

(Why has no one developed a democratic corporation?)

Exactly the same tendency makes us instinctively think that problems should be solved by having a (problem domain) king who solves them.

Comment author: fubarobfusco 08 September 2011 01:52:58AM 11 points [-]

(Why has no one developed a democratic corporation?)

They're called cooperatives.

Comment author: michael61 08 September 2011 04:40:14AM *  2 points [-]

other examples, Mondragon Corporation and many private companies have democratic decision policies

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 08 September 2011 03:25:11PM 2 points [-]

Yes, but you've merely labeled the tendency. You haven't explained it. I can spin some plausible sounding evolutionary explanations, but what I'm really interested in is the level of cognitive science.

Comment author: Yvain 09 September 2011 12:23:02PM 7 points [-]

If I had to come up with a cognitive science explanation for pro-regulation, regardless of political considerations around whether regulation was good or bad, it would be that failures from too little regulation are obvious, direct, and heartrending (child dies of toxic unproven medicine) and failures from too much regulation are distributed and invisible (child dies of cancer, with no one knowing that a cure sits in a lab somewhere but it's too expensive to license it).

This is because regulation, as a specific action taken to stop a problem, gets to optimize for fighting the most obvious, scary problems in the most direct way - whereas nonregulation, as a null action, doesn't get to optimize for that at all.

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 10 September 2011 08:34:34PM 1 point [-]

This is the "seen and unseen" reasoning from my original comment, but something more seems to be going on with regulation. Why are people more quick to point out corruption in a corporation than in a government? Or am I just wrong about this fact? Maybe the seen and unseen reasoning explains the difference in this particular context and in other contexts there is no difference.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 15 September 2011 10:28:29PM *  -2 points [-]

Right now, Virginia is regulating abortion clinics, making them meet hospital standards, in order to protect womens' safety. Yet I don't think there are any known cases of failures from too little regulation in Virginia abortion clinics. At least, I haven't heard any brought up.

Comment author: Unnamed 16 September 2011 04:44:22PM 6 points [-]

Abortion is not a good example to use here since it is often overregulated intentionally by politicians who oppose abortion and want to make abortions harder to get. There is no bias to explain because the policy fits their goal of restricting abortion.

Comment author: Yvain 16 September 2011 08:19:56AM 1 point [-]

Do you mean no cases of failure from too little regulation that couldn't have been solved more cleverly by nonregulatory means, no cases of failure where the "solving" regulation didn't have problems of its own, or just that you literally can't think of any any cases ever of failures from too little regulation?

If you really mean the last, then avoiding modern-day issues so we don't get into a fight, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory, thalidomide babies, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill seem like go-to historical examples.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 16 September 2011 03:33:41PM *  1 point [-]

I mean that I haven't heard anybody in the debate say, "Person X went to an abortion clinic in Virginia, and something bad happened that would have been prevented by these rules." So the impulse to regulate isn't due just to the easy availability of instances of under-regulation over instances of over-regulation.

Comment author: [deleted] 16 September 2011 04:43:08PM 3 points [-]

Presumably "Person X went to an abortion clinic in Virginia, and an abortion happened" fits the bill for a lot of participants in that debate.

Comment author: [deleted] 15 September 2011 11:04:52PM 1 point [-]

There was a pretty notorious case of a bad abortion clinic in Philadelphia: http://healthland.time.com/2011/01/21/philly-abortion-horrors-what-matters-is-how-and-not-when-an-abortion-is-done-says-expert/

Whether the proposed regulation could help prevent similar cases in VA, I have no idea, but if it means more oversight, you know, it seems plausible.