i.e. you know you're awake when you have subjective experience of phenomenal consciousness. :-) Or something very close to this - that may not be the most nuanced, 100% correct way of stating it.
Would you say that only a functionalist can know whether they are awake, because only a functionalist knows what consciousness is? I presume not. But that means that it is possible to name and identify what consciousness is, and to say that I am awake and that I know it, in terms which do not presuppose functionalism. In this we have both the justification for the jargon terms "subjective experience" and "phenomenal consciousness", and also the reason why the hard problem is a problem. If the existence of consciousness is not logically identical with the existence of a particular causal-functional system, then I can legitimately ask why the existence of that system leads to the existence of an accompanying conscious experience. And that "why" is the hard problem of consciousness.
Thanks for your comment but I don't understand it.
I encounter many intelligent people (not usually LWers, though) who say that despite our recent scientific advances, human consciousness remains a mystery and currently intractable to science. This is wrong. Empirically distinguishable theories of consciousness have been around for at least 15 years, and the data are beginning to favor some theories over others. For a recent example, see this August 2011 article from Lau & Rosenthal in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, one of my favorite journals. (Review articles, yay!)
Abstract: