Mercurial comments on Human consciousness as a tractable scientific problem - Less Wrong

9 Post author: lukeprog 09 September 2011 06:39AM

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Comment author: summerstay 10 September 2011 02:41:35PM *  1 point [-]

I find David Chalmers's explanation of what is meant by "qualia" and "subjective experience" and "something its like to be" the easiest to understand. For example, read the first chapter of <i>The Conscious Mind</i>.
The Knowledge Argument above refers to the fictional story of Mary the color scientist. She was raised in a black and white environment and never saw color. But she read textbooks on color theory (printed in black and white, of course.) The question is, when she finally experiences the color blue, how is that different from the previous knowledge she had about what the color blue would be like? That different extra aspect to the actual experience is what we refer to as qualia, and how such an experience can be caused by physical processes is (in Chalmers's terminology that has now been widely adopted) the Hard Problem.

Comment author: Mercurial 11 September 2011 04:19:07PM 1 point [-]

That's a really clear description! Thanks for summarizing it.

I suspect it's highly relevant that if someone were to actually grow up in a grayscale environment, they wouldn't be capable of experiencing blue. Even if the optic nerve had somehow retained the ability to transmit data from cones, the brain simply would not be wired for blue-processing. I'm pretty sure her brain would interpret a colored world the way a black-and-white television would. (This is my understanding of neuroscience, by the way, not my stab at philosophy.)

I haven't taken the time to think carefully about the implications of this. It just seems suspicious to me that one of the clearest descriptions of qualia I've encountered involves a process that's neurologically implausible to enact.

Comment author: red75 11 September 2011 05:04:27PM 1 point [-]

I suspect it's highly relevant that if someone were to actually grow up in a grayscale environment, they wouldn't be capable of experiencing blue.

Results of gene therapy for color blindness suggest otherwise. Maybe those monkeys and mice cannot experience colors, but they react as if they can.

I'm really want to try this myself. Infrared sensitive opsin in a retina, isn't it wonderful?