Plasmon comments on Human consciousness as a tractable scientific problem - Less Wrong

9 Post author: lukeprog 09 September 2011 06:39AM

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Comment author: Ghazzali 19 January 2012 04:21:49PM -1 points [-]

The fact that the problem cannot be explained is because of the limitations of language/logic/reason....the tools that we rely on to explain mechanical phenomenon. Things that require equal signs.

The fact that this subject is not easilly explainable is not a hit against our side, it is a hit against your side. It is the non-rational aspect of consciousness that makes it seemingly impossible to explain in the first place.

The reaction of reductionists and some rationalists (I argue that it is quite rational to conlude that this is indeed a mystery as of present time) that because we cannot explain what that sensation of 'pain' is then it may not exist to begin with is dubious at best.

Comment author: Plasmon 19 January 2012 06:14:35PM *  4 points [-]

"You can't explain the precession of the perihelion of Mercury" is a hit against Newton's theory of gravity.

"You can't explain "zoink", and I can't tell you what "zoink" is, nor what an explanation of "zoink" would look like" is not a hit against anything.

Also, arguments are not soldiers, and talking about "hits" and "sides" is unwise.

There have, in history, been many occasions where something was not understood. When temperature was not understood, it was still possible to explain to someone what this ill-understood "temperature" was. Specifically, it is simple to make sure that your notion of "colour" or "temperature" is similar to my notion of "colour" or "temperature" even if I don't understand what "colour" and "temperature" are.

I predict that there has never been a concept that

  • was not understood at some point in time

  • was "not easily explicable" in the sense that "the subjective experience of pain" is not easily explicable

  • later turned out to be well-defined and to "cut reality at its joints"

If you can come up with an example of such a concept, I will start taking arguments from vague not-easily-explicable concepts far more seriously.

On the other hand, there are at least some concepts that

  • were not understood at some point in time

  • were "not easily explicable" in the sense that "the subjective experience of pain" is not easily explicable

  • turned out to be completely bogus

namely, the concepts of "soul", "god", etc...

Comment author: Ghazzali 19 January 2012 09:48:12PM 0 points [-]

Sorry for the allegorical language if it offended you.

There is a difference between not finding a solution for a problem, and not even understanding what a solution may look like even in the abstract form.

It is also not a good sign when the problem gets to be more of a mystery the more science we discover.

The concern here is that we have an irrational view that rationalism is a universal tool. The fact that we have unsolved scientific and intellectual problems is not a proof of that. The fact that there seem to be problems that in their very nature seem to be unsolvable by reason is.

Comment author: Plasmon 20 January 2012 06:56:25AM 2 points [-]

Sorry for the allegorical language if it offended you.

I am not offended

There is a difference between not finding a solution for a problem, and not even understanding what a solution may look like even in the abstract form.

Certainly. And further on that scale, there is "understanding so little of the problem that you're nor even sure there's a problem in the first place".

Progress on the the P vs NP problem has been largely limited to determining what the solution doesn't look like , and few if any people have any idea what it does look like, or if it (a solution) even exists (might be undecidable).

So, this scale goes

  • Solved problems

  • Unsolved problems where we have a pretty good idea what the solution looks like

  • Unsolved problems where we have no idea what the solution looks like : subjective experience is not here

  • problems we suspect exist, but can't even define properly in the first place : subjective experience is here!

It is also not a good sign when the problem gets to be more of a mystery the more science we discover.

Consciousness and the subjective experience of pain have not gotten more mysterious the more science we discover. At worst, we understand exactly as much now as we did when we started, i.e. nothing (and neurologists would certainly argue we do understand more now).

The concern here is that we have an irrational view that rationalism is a universal tool.

It is. Have a look at Solomonoff induction

The fact that we have unsolved scientific and intellectual problems is not a proof of that.

It's not proof, but it is evidence.

The fact that there seem to be problems that in their very nature seem to be unsolvable by reason is.

What makes you think that these problems are "in their very nature unsolvable by reason" ? Is it because you think they are inherently mysterious ?

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