One think always bothered me about this post. Its main thrust appears to be that one should use (something like) a Komogorov prior rather than one's intuitive prior because that is what the universe looks like, except we then adjust this prior with the same evidence we used to determine what the prior should be. That seems like double-counting evidence.
Today's post, Occam's Razor was originally published on 26 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Einstein's Arrogance, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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