That would require that I had asserted I agreed with the underlying premise that UFAI was a significant risk.
At the moment, I do not.
I also find it rather unsurprising that the comment in question has been as far down-voted as it has been, though once again I am left noting how while I am not surprised, I am disappointed with LW in general. This is happening too often, I fear.
That would require that I had asserted I agreed with the underlying premise that UFAI was a significant risk.
At the moment, I do not.
I wouldn't be terribly surprised, though, if this were the sort of consideration likely to be conveniently ignored by those in charge of enforcing the relevant laws in your jurisdiction!
Here's a poser that occurred to us over the summer, and one that we couldn't really come up with any satisfactory solution to. The people who work at the Singularity Institute have a high estimate of the probability that an Unfriendly AI will destroy the world. People who work for http://nuclearrisk.org/ have a very high estimate of the probability that a nuclear war will destroy the world (by their estimates, if you are American and under 40, then nuclear war is the single most likely way in which you might die next year).
It seems like there are good reasons to take these numbers seriously, because Eliezer is probably the world expert on AI risk, and Hellman is probably the world expert on nuclear risk. However, there's a problem - Eliezer is an expert on AI risk because he believes that AI risk is a bigger risk than nuclear war. Similarly, Hellman chose to study nuclear risks and not AI risk I because he had a higher than average estimate of the threat of nuclear war.
It seems like it might be a good idea to know what the probability of each of these risks is. Is there a sensible way for these people to correct for the fact that the people studying these risks are those that have high estimate of them in the first place?