scav comments on Concepts Don't Work That Way - Less Wrong

57 Post author: lukeprog 28 September 2011 02:01AM

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Comment author: scav 28 September 2011 02:21:00PM 1 point [-]

a 'concept' is something in my brain that defines a set

I don't think you do have anything in your brain that defines a set, except when you formulate a precise verbal or other description of an actual mathematical set. Which is not what you're doing when you ponder a concept like beauty.

In the instant that you think about whether something is "beautiful" the concept is a transient configuration of neuron state that at one particular point in time associates something in your memory or perception with the word "beautiful". In which case it's not any more meaningful than any other random association that happens to occur.

How would you tell this is what is happening instead of your brain containing a well-defined set? First note, it is not going to be consistent - you will change your mind. It's also not going to be complete - there will be things where you don't have any particular feeling about whether they are beautiful. Also, you will be able to say whether things are beautiful even when they aren't a discrete thing and have boundaries just as fuzzy as the concept you relate them to (e.g. a beach with surrounding landscape). And you will do this without even noticing.

Comment author: byrnema 28 September 2011 03:21:25PM *  0 points [-]

In a way, I completely agree with you. I agree with you in the sense that I think you are slicing reality in exactly the right way, and any remaining disagreement is just definitional.

transient configuration of neuron state that at one particular point in time associates something in your memory or perception with the word "beautiful". In which case it's not any more meaningful than any other random association that happens to occur.

Agreed, we should distinguish this random-association-type thought from the brain process (however it may be done) of mentally defining a set.

What I want to do next is say that at this random-association stage of a thought process, you don't have a concept. Ithink you haven't seized a concept unless you've defined the set. The concept, if it is lurking there, hasn't been understood and hasn't been 'owned'.

the concept is a transient configuration of neuron state

Yes, I think this transience is what makes it difficult to recognize and discuss concepts correctly. For example, in several places 'concept families' have been mentioned, as though the primary object is a fuzzy set and at instances of thought we're picking out particular sets from this fuzzy family. I see this reversed: sets are always specific, but our thoughts transition so fluidly from one set to a nearby set that we imagine there is a single larger fuzzy set that these sets are coming from.

For example, when we think of the set of fish, we are likely to first consider something like 'the set of animals that look just like Nemo, but with any color variation'. (This is what was referred to as a 'most typical' member.) Then a few seconds later we remember sharks are also fish and throw them in. Both sets are called 'fish' in our minds from one moment to the next, but they were different sets and our brain can distinguish them, we just didn't bother to track the differences as our concept of 'fish' evolved. So a thought process will evolve a lineage of sets SetFish1-->SetFish2-->SetFish3 over the course of a few seconds.

I think the fact that our brain can easily distinguish them all (via necessary and sufficient conditions, if not actual single-word linguistic tokens) is evidence that we understand the individual sets first, and the understanding (concept) of a 'fuzzy set family' comes from the observation and generalization of this lineage.

Note: I mean, this is what I think now. I'd be interested in a different paradigm for how my brain understands a concept and/or a set.