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wedrifid comments on Open thread, October 2011 - Less Wrong
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From memory of The Evolution of Cooperation-- the soldiers didn't refuse to fire their artillery. They aimed to miss.
Artillery truces drove the generals crazy, and they tried various solutions that I don't remember. None of the solutions worked until they discovered by accident that frequently rotating the artillery crews meant that histories of trust couldn't be developed.
Perhaps the generals could be viewed as building cooperation at their own level to maintain the killing.
And as defectors against the soldiers. That sounds about right. If only soldiers were better at coordinating against their commanding officers!
The standard prisoner's dilemma assumes a symmetrical grid, with both prisoners getting the same punishments under the same circumstances. I don't know whether unequal power (access to rewards, risk and severity of punishment) has been explored.
This isn't a prisoner's dilemma. But the term 'defection' is not specific to the prisoner's dilemma.
They have. Both with actual Prisoner's Dilemmas with non-equivalent payoffs and in various other games which take similar forms. In the former case the guy with the lower payoff tends to defect more to try to get 'equality'. But that is in a situation in which the subjects consider themselves of equal status (probably volunteer undergrads).