My personal decision theory has no problems dismissing noise-level influences, because they do not matter.
You keep trying to replace the original problem with your own: "how many sand specks constitute a heap?" This is not at issue here, as no heap is ever formed for any single one of the 3^^^3 people.
no heap is ever formed for anyone of the 3^^^3 people.
That's not one of the guarantees you're given, that a trillion other agents won't be given similar choices. You're not given the guarantee that your dilemma between minute disutility for astronomical numbers, and a single huge disutility will be the only such dilemma anyone will ever have in the history of the universe, and you don't have the guarantee that the decisions of a trillion different agents won't pile up.
Today's post, Torture vs. Dust Specks was originally published on 30 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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