Only if you assume that the dust speck decisions must be made in utter ignorance of the (trillion-1) other decisions. If the ignorance is less than utter, a nonlinear utility function that accepts the one dust speck will stop making the decision in favor of dust specks before universes go blind.
For example, since I know how Texas will vote for President next year (it will give its Electoral College votes to the Republican), I can instead use my vote to signal which minor-party candidate strikes me as the most attractive, thus promoting his party relative to the others, without having to worry whether my vote will elect him or cost my preferred candidate the election. Obviously, if everyone else in Texas did the same, some minor party candidate would win, but that doesn't matter, because it isn't going to happen.
Today's post, Torture vs. Dust Specks was originally published on 30 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
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