Logos01, we seem to be using different definitions of "rational behavior". So far I can't tell if this stems from a political dispute, or a factual disagreement, or just an argument that took on a life of its own.

We are, and I initially noted this when I parsed "rational behavior" from "instrumentally rational behavior".

Please try to state your first claim (from the great-grandparent comment) without using the word "rational" or "reason" or any synonym thereof.

This is a request that is definitionally impossible, since the topic at hand was "what is rational behavior".

For my own position: if you choose not to do what works or "wins", then complaining about how you conformed to the right principles will accomplish nothing (except in cases where complaining does help). It will not change the outcome, nor will it increase your knowledge.

No contest.

In my case, what I was getting at was the notion that it is possible to present a counterfactual scenario where doing what "loses" is rationally necessary. For this to occur it would be necessary for the processes of rationality available to Louis-the-Loser to have a set of goals, and come to the conclusion that it is necessary to violate all of them.

Let's assume that Louis-the-Loser has a supergoal of giving all humans more happiness over time. Over time, Louis comes to the factual conclusion (with total certainty) that humans are dead set on reducing their happiness to negative levels -- permanently; and that further they have the capacity to do so. Perhaps you now think that Louis's sole remaining rational decision is to fail his supergoal: to kill all humans. And this would be maximal happiness for humans since he'd prevent negative happiness, yes? (And therefore, "win")

But there's a second answer to this question. And it is equally rationally viable. Give the humans what they want. Allow them to constantly and continuously maximize their unhappiness; perhaps even facilitate them in that endeavor. Now, why is this a reasonable thing to do? Because even total certainty can be wrong, and even P=1 statements can be revised.

However, it does require Louis to actually lose.

In my opinion, quoting is authorship to a much greater extent than it is typically considered.

That's actually an interesting thought, and I'd tend to agree with you in how you presented it.

Two thoughts here:

1. While it's fair to not assume I am familiar with everything Eliezer's ever said or written, the mere fact that he is the source of the statement has no bearing on whether it is valid or not. Appeals to authority are always fallacious; arguments stand or fall on their own.

2. "Providing context" without explanation while citing a specific line of text that isn't the thing you are "providing context" to, by the way, is a very conventional manner of making an argument of your own in the form of citing someone else's own argument as your own.

If it wasn't your intent to make that appear to be an argument to the dialogue, perhaps being cognizant of this would help you not make that communication gaffe in the future. :)