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endoself comments on Rational to distrust your own rationality? - Less Wrong
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This does not match how I observe my own brain to work. I see the guaranteed million vs the 1% risk of nothing and think "Oh no, what if I lose. I'd sure feel bad about my choice then.". Of course, thinking more deeply I realize that the 10% chance of an extra $4 million outweighs that downside, but it is not as obvious to my brain even though I value it more. If I were less careful, less intelligent, or less introspective, I feel that I would have 'gone with my instinct' and chosen 1A. (It is probably a good thing I am slightly tired right now, since this process happened more slowly than usual, so I think that I got a better look at it happening.)
You see, the reason for why it is discussed as an "effect" or "paradox" is that even if your risk aversion ("oh no what if I lose") is taken into account, it is strange to take 1A together with 2B. A risk averse person might "correctly" chose 1A, but that for person to be consistent in its choices has to chose 2A. Not 1A and 2B together.
My suggestion is that the slight increase in complexity in 1A adds to your risk (external risk+internal risk) and therefore within your given risk profile makes 1A and 2B a consistent combination.
Well when I look at experiment 1, I feel the risk. My brain simulates my reaction upon getting nothing and does not reduce its emotional weight in accordance with its unlikeliness. Looking at experiment 2, I see the possibility and think, "Well, I'd be screwed either way if I'm not lucky, so I'll just look at the other possibility.". My system 1 thought ignores the 89% vs 90% distinction as pointless, and, while not consistent with its other decision, it is right to do so.