JoshuaZ comments on Query the LessWrong Hivemind - Less Wrong

18 Post author: D_Malik 08 November 2011 09:37AM

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Comment author: Zed 08 November 2011 12:52:17PM *  1 point [-]

P(Simulation) < 0.01; little evidence in favor of it and it requires that there is some other intelligence doing the simulation, that there can be the kind of fault-tolerant hardware that can (flawlessly) compute the universe. I don't think posthuman ancestors are capable of running a universe as a simulation. I think Bostrom's simulation argument is sound.

1 - P(Solipsism) > 0.999; My mind doesn't contain minds that are consistently smarter than I am and can out-think me on every level.

P(Dreaming) < 0.001; We don't dream of meticulously filling out tax forms and doing the dishes.

[ Probabilities are not discounted for expecting to come into contact with additional evidence or arguments ]

Comment author: JoshuaZ 08 November 2011 01:42:18PM 0 points [-]

Given your argument, I'm a bit confused by why you assign such a high upper bound to P(Solipsism).

Comment author: Zed 08 November 2011 01:47:50PM *  1 point [-]

Ah, you're right. Thanks for the correction.

I edited the post above. I intended P(Solipsism) < 0.001

And now I think a bit more about it I realize the arguments I gave are probably not "my true objections". They are mostly appeals to (my) intuition.