Suppose we built a super-duper Watson that passed the Turing test and had some limited capacity to improve itself by, e.g., going out and fetching new information from the Internet. That sort of system strikes me as the likeliest one to meet the bar of "AGI" in the next few years. It isn't particularly far from current research.
This seems like a plausible way of blowing up the universe, but not in the next few years. This kind of thing requires a lot of development, I'd give it 30-60 years at least.
I have stopped understanding why these quotes are correct. Help!
More specifically, if you design an AI using "shallow insights" without an explicit goal-directed architecture - some program that "just happens" to make intelligent decisions that can be viewed by us as fulfilling certain goals - then it has no particular reason to stabilize its goals. Isn't that anthropomorphizing? We humans don't exhibit a lot of goal-directed behavior, but we do have a verbal concept of "goals", so the verbal phantom of "figuring out our true goals" sounds meaningful to us. But why would AIs behave the same way if they don't think verbally? It looks more likely to me that an AI that acts semi-haphazardly may well continue doing so even after amassing a lot of computing power. Or is there some more compelling argument that I'm missing?