Given enough computing power, humans can create a haphazardly smart jumble of wires by simulated evolution, or uploading small chunks of human brains and prodding them, or any number of other ways I didn't think of. In a certain sense these methods can be called "shallow". I see no reason why all such creatures would necessarily have an urge to stabilize their values.
When you talk about AI, do you mean general intelligence, as in being competent in arbitrary domains (given enough computing power), or narrow AI, which can succeed on some classes of tasks but fail on others? I would certainly agree that narrow AI does not need to be goal-directed, and the future will surely contain many such AI. And maybe there are ways to achieve general intelligence other than through a goal-directed architecture, but since that's already fairly simple, and all of our theories and existing examples point towards it, it just seems very ...
I have stopped understanding why these quotes are correct. Help!
More specifically, if you design an AI using "shallow insights" without an explicit goal-directed architecture - some program that "just happens" to make intelligent decisions that can be viewed by us as fulfilling certain goals - then it has no particular reason to stabilize its goals. Isn't that anthropomorphizing? We humans don't exhibit a lot of goal-directed behavior, but we do have a verbal concept of "goals", so the verbal phantom of "figuring out our true goals" sounds meaningful to us. But why would AIs behave the same way if they don't think verbally? It looks more likely to me that an AI that acts semi-haphazardly may well continue doing so even after amassing a lot of computing power. Or is there some more compelling argument that I'm missing?