Could be, but not particularly plausible if would still naturally qualify as "AI-caused catastrophe", rather than primarily a nanotech/physics experiment/tools going wrong with a bit of AI facilitating the catastrophe.
(I'm interested in what you think about the AGI competence=goals thesis. To me this seems to dissolve the question and I'm curious if I'm missing the point.)
That doesn't sound right. What if I save people on Mondays and kill people on Tuesdays, being very competent at both? You could probably stretch the definition of "goal" to explain such behavior, but it seems easier to say that competence is just competence.
I have stopped understanding why these quotes are correct. Help!
More specifically, if you design an AI using "shallow insights" without an explicit goal-directed architecture - some program that "just happens" to make intelligent decisions that can be viewed by us as fulfilling certain goals - then it has no particular reason to stabilize its goals. Isn't that anthropomorphizing? We humans don't exhibit a lot of goal-directed behavior, but we do have a verbal concept of "goals", so the verbal phantom of "figuring out our true goals" sounds meaningful to us. But why would AIs behave the same way if they don't think verbally? It looks more likely to me that an AI that acts semi-haphazardly may well continue doing so even after amassing a lot of computing power. Or is there some more compelling argument that I'm missing?