Not sure if I understand you correctly; let me try to rephrase it.
You are saying it is possible I claim confusion because I expect to gain status (contrarian status maybe?), as per Kaj's post, instead of being actually confused? Sure. I considered it, but rejected it because that weakens the explanatory power of status signalling. (I'm not sure if I agree with the signalling assumption, but let's for the sake of the argument.)
A real problem exists if an agent tries to optimize for a goal, but sucks at it. It's own beliefs are not relevant (unless the goal is about its beliefs). If Kaj is correct, then humans are optimizing for status, but sacrifice some accuracy of their self-modelling power. It seems to work out, so how is this problematic?
In other words, an agent wants X. It models itself to get better at getting X. The self-model is, among other things, the basis for communication with other agents. The self-model is biased to model itself wrongly as wanting Y. It is advantageous for the agent to be seen as wanting Y, not X. The inaccurate self-model doesn't cause substantial damage to its ability to pursue X, and it is much easier for the self-model to be biased than to lie. This setup sounds like a feature, not like a bug. If you observed it in an organism that wasn't you, wasn't even human, would you say the organism has a problem?
I'm saying it's possible that what's really going on is that you think Kaj is mistaken when he calls the situation a problem... that he has made an error. But rather than say "Kay, you are mistaken, you have made an error" you say "Kaj, I'm confused." And that the reason you do this is because to say "Kay, you are mistaken, you have made an error" is to challenge Kaj's status, which would potentially subject you to reprisals.
It's possible that you're doing this deliberately. In that case, by convention we would say you aren't ...
I have become convinced that problems of this kind are the number one problem humanity has. I'm also pretty sure that most people here, no matter how much they've been reading about signaling, still fail to appreciate the magnitude of the problem.
Here are two major screw-ups and one narrowly averted screw-up that I've been guilty of. See if you can find the pattern.
It may not be immediately obvious, but all three examples have something in common. In each case, I thought I was working for a particular goal (become capable of doing useful Singularity work, advance the cause of a political party, do useful Singularity work). But as soon as I set that goal, my brain automatically and invisibly re-interpreted it as the goal of doing something that gave the impression of doing prestigious work for a cause (spending all my waking time working, being the spokesman of a political party, writing papers or doing something else few others could do). "Prestigious work" could also be translated as "work that really convinces others that you are doing something valuable for a cause".
We run on corrupted hardware: our minds are composed of many modules, and the modules that evolved to make us seem impressive and gather allies are also evolved to subvert the ones holding our conscious beliefs. Even when we believe that we are working on something that may ultimately determine the fate of humanity, our signaling modules may hijack our goals so as to optimize for persuading outsiders that we are working on the goal, instead of optimizing for achieving the goal!
You can see this all the time, everywhere:
There's an additional caveat to be aware of: it is actually possible to fall prey to this problem while purposefully attempting to avoid it. You might realize that you have a tendency to only want to do particularly prestigeful work for a cause... so you decide to only do the least prestigeful work available, in order to prove that you are the kind of person who doesn't care about the prestige of the task! You are still optimizing your actions on the basis of expected prestige and being able to tell yourself and outsiders an impressive story, not on the basis of your marginal impact.