I don't know. The part I took issue with was saying that goals can be more or less rational, just based on the existence of an "objectively justifiable" universal prior. There are generally many ways to arrange heaps of pebbles into rectangles (assuming we can cut them into partial pebbles). Say that you discover that the ideal width of a pebble rectangle is 13. Well... you still don't know what the ideal total number of pebbles is. An ideal width of 13 just gives you a preferred way to arrange any number of pebbles. It doesn't tell you what the preferred length is, and indeed it will vary for different numbers of total pebbles.
Similarly, the important thing for an agent, the thing you can most easily measure, is the decisions they make in various situations. Given this and the "ideal objective solomonoff prior" you could derive a utility function that would explain the agent's behaviour when combined with the solomonoff prior. But all that is is a way to divide an agent into goals and beliefs.
In other words, an "objectively justifiable" universal prior only enforces an "objectively justifiable" relation between your goals and your actions (aka. num_pebbles = 13 * length). It doesn't tell you what your goals should be any more than it tells you what your actions should be.
I don't know if any of that made sense, but basically it looks to me like you're trying to solve a system of equations in three variables (prior, goals, actions) where you only have two equations (prior = X, actions = prior * goals). It doesn't have a unique solution.
Everything you have said makes sense to me. Thanks. I will respond substantially at a later time.
I have become convinced that problems of this kind are the number one problem humanity has. I'm also pretty sure that most people here, no matter how much they've been reading about signaling, still fail to appreciate the magnitude of the problem.
Here are two major screw-ups and one narrowly averted screw-up that I've been guilty of. See if you can find the pattern.
It may not be immediately obvious, but all three examples have something in common. In each case, I thought I was working for a particular goal (become capable of doing useful Singularity work, advance the cause of a political party, do useful Singularity work). But as soon as I set that goal, my brain automatically and invisibly re-interpreted it as the goal of doing something that gave the impression of doing prestigious work for a cause (spending all my waking time working, being the spokesman of a political party, writing papers or doing something else few others could do). "Prestigious work" could also be translated as "work that really convinces others that you are doing something valuable for a cause".
We run on corrupted hardware: our minds are composed of many modules, and the modules that evolved to make us seem impressive and gather allies are also evolved to subvert the ones holding our conscious beliefs. Even when we believe that we are working on something that may ultimately determine the fate of humanity, our signaling modules may hijack our goals so as to optimize for persuading outsiders that we are working on the goal, instead of optimizing for achieving the goal!
You can see this all the time, everywhere:
There's an additional caveat to be aware of: it is actually possible to fall prey to this problem while purposefully attempting to avoid it. You might realize that you have a tendency to only want to do particularly prestigeful work for a cause... so you decide to only do the least prestigeful work available, in order to prove that you are the kind of person who doesn't care about the prestige of the task! You are still optimizing your actions on the basis of expected prestige and being able to tell yourself and outsiders an impressive story, not on the basis of your marginal impact.