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JoshuaZ comments on [LINK] Scientists create mammalian H5N1 - Less Wrong
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This is extremely unlikely to be an existential risk, and working with such viruses helps a lot to understanding how to combat similar viruses. It is very important that they be very careful that they don't get out of the lab, but the level of precautions generally taken for this sort of thing is extremely high.
The important thing about this research is that it shifts our estimate of the likelihood of H5N1 human-to-human transmission upward (for all intents and purposes, ferrets can be considered little humans when talking about flu). Some previous research (theoretical, not experimental) indicated that it was nearly impossible for this to occur, requiring multiple "high energy" (i.e. low-probability) mutations. These guys seem to have done it relatively easily, which is pretty horrifying.
It is indeed unlikely that the particular virus bred by the Dutch lab will get out (it's a BSL-3 lab), but that's not the danger being discussed by NSABB (and many others). The concern is that the knowledge of how to produce such a virus, if published, could be used for bioterrorism.
Whether doing or publishing this type of research is worth it from an x-risk perspective is a tough issue, but that such a virus could be produced at all is indisputably bad news.
My concern is that publishing that it was successfully done significantly narrows the search space for people looking to commit bioterrorism, even if they don't publish how it is done.
That's an excellent point!