Just that you were applying [the principle of self-determination] to torture while not applying it to dust specks - a qualitative difference.
Not even remotely. I applied it to both; it simply does not alter the anti-utility of dust specks. Receiving a dust-speck in one's eye does not alter in any measurable way the capacity for self-determination of an arbitrary individual.
You never said, it, and yet in your argument only the secondary factors mattered to your decision.
False. The secondary consequences when added to the primary caused torture, even in the linear-additive condition, to be the worse option. They overwhelmed the primary.
If you don't think you can judge how much you'd like two worlds to exist independent of there being someone in those worlds to make a "choice," then you reject utilitarianism.
... what? At what point, exactly, did this become a valid thing for you to say to me? The hypothetical asked us which scenario was worse. That is a choice to be made.
Furthermore, exactly how does the notion of required agency abrogate utilitarianism? That doesn't even remotely compute. Of the many-fold forms of utilitarianism of which I am aware, not a single one has such a standard. The very notion of a moral system which might require that it be applicable without an agent is self-contradicting.
My guess would be when your argument wasn't in alignment with the ceteris paribus principle.
Ahh. I must conclude that either you haven't been reading a single thing I've written, or else you are delusional, or else you are writing to me somehow from a parallel world. Or you are simply lying. These are the only available options, as your statement is not in accordance with the reality I can observe in this comment thread.
Because the consequences that "actually count" were the ones that make up the original problem.
This is not even remotely interesting as an argument. The consequences of the original problem are those consequences the original problem's choices would result in. Your failure to consider those consequences does not, under any rational circumstances, mean those consequences did not exist. It only means that you made an incomplete analysis.
And that, of course, was my original point: that the rejection of secondary consequences was a failure of analysis. They were there.
"Secondary consequences" that are not logically equivalent (this does not mean causally related) to the original consequences merely mean that you're answering a different question than the one that was asked.
A consequence of an action or history is a consequence of that action or history. When selecting from a given action or history against another, as a consequentialistic utilitarian, one must weigh the consequences of a given action or history against one another. That is essentially a tautological statement.
Now -- let's try this again: what makes one category of consequences "real" consequences, and others "unimportant", and why are you the arbiter of these things? Why are some forms of utility "countable" and others "ignorable"? Furthermore, on what grounds can you possibly justify making such an assertion and still call yourself a utilitarian?
Please, in responding, do note that the mere assertion that consequences are not logically equivalent to consequences will not fly. It is a non-argument. You'll simply have to provide an actual argument if you expect me to begin to be convinced of your position. Thus far, it seems inherently paradoxical. You expect me to believe that A != A. My brain is not wired to accept such paradoxes.
I'll start winding down my answers now. This looks like it may actually hit reverse returns.
Just that you were applying [the principle of self-determination] to torture while not applying it to dust specks - a qualitative difference.
Not even remotely. I applied it to both; it simply does not alter the anti-utility of dust specks. Receiving a dust-speck in one's eye does not alter in any measurable way the capacity for self-determination of an arbitrary individual.
And yet not long ago you said this:
...To select 3^^^3 people to get dust specks in the
For those not familiar with the topic, Torture vs. Dustspecks asks the question: "Would you prefer that one person be horribly tortured for fifty years without hope or rest, or that 3^^^3 people get dust specks in their eyes?"
Most of the discussion that I have noted on the topic takes one of two assumptions in deriving their answer to that question: I think of one as the 'linear additive' answer, which says that torture is the proper choice for the utilitarian consequentialist, because a single person can only suffer so much over a fifty year window, as compared to the incomprehensible number of individuals who suffer only minutely; the other I think of as the 'logarithmically additive' answer, which inverts the answer on the grounds that forms of suffering are not equal, and cannot be added as simple 'units'.
What I have never yet seen is something akin to the notion expressed in Ursula K LeGuin's The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas.If you haven't read it, I won't spoil it for you.
I believe that any metric of consequence which takes into account only suffering when making the choice of "torture" vs. "dust specks" misses the point. There are consequences to such a choice that extend beyond the suffering inflicted; moral responsibility, standards of behavior that either choice makes acceptable, and so on. Any solution to the question which ignores these elements in making its decision might be useful in revealing one's views about the nature of cumulative suffering, but beyond that are of no value in making practical decisions -- they cannot be, as 'consequence' extends beyond the mere instantiation of a given choice -- the exact pain inflicted by either scenario -- into the kind of society that such a choice would result in.
While I myself tend towards the 'logarithmic' than the 'linear' additive view of suffering, even if I stipulate the linear additive view, I still cannot agree with the conclusion of torture over the dust speck, for the same reason why I do not condone torture even in the "ticking time bomb" scenario: I cannot accept the culture/society that would permit such a torture to exist. To arbitrarily select out one individual for maximal suffering in order to spare others a negligible amount would require a legal or moral framework that accepted such choices, and this violates the principle of individual self-determination -- a principle I have seen Less Wrong's community spend a great deal of time trying to consider how to incorporate into Friendliness solutions for AGI. We as a society already implement something similar to this, economically: we accept taxing everyone, even according to a graduated scheme. What we do not accept is enslaving 20% of the population to provide for the needs of the State.
If there is a flaw in my reasoning here, please enlighten me.