Rationality Quotes December 2011
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB.
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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-John Nash, A Beautiful Mind
In other words, recognizing that politics is the mind-killer helped Nash manage his paranoid-scizophrenia.
Or, at least, he believes it did.
Are you saying that it actually didn't help Nash manage his scizophrenia or are you just inserting the uncertainty back into that statement?
The latter. I don't think Nash is a reliable narrator.
EDIT: And not merely because of his schizophrenia. Without hard data, I'd be hard-pressed to evaluate whether or not learning a mental habit increased or decreased my sanity, and that's assuming I'm sane to begin with.
-Sherlock Holmes, A Study in Scarlet
Reminds me of some Warhammer 40,000 quotes:
Always liked that last one. There are memes out there I'd rather not get infected with.
Though don't listen to me; I find it impossible not to like anything said by Isador Akios.
Really? The last quote seems expressly anti-rationality. Especially considering the source.
Some of us enjoy the challenge of finding rationalist ideas in unlikely places - or fitting ideas from non-rational sources into a rationalist framework. In this case, it seems fairly easy to do so. As Markus already points out, it is important to keep your mind from becoming infected with bad stuff.
Indeed it is. But the way you fight "memetic infection" in the real world is to take a look at the bad stuff and see where it goes wrong, not to isolate yourself from harmful ideas.
Yes. In this metaphor, the guard at the gates takes a look at the bad stuff and decides against letting it into the fortress.
One could make an argument that, in the world of Warhammer 40K, keeping your mind barred and guarded is actually the most rational thing to do. Because if you do not, then instead of saying things like "only in death does duty end", you'll find yourself saying things like, "maim kill burn MAIM KILL BURN" and "Arrghbllgghhayargh NURGLE". Only it wouldn't be you saying those things, precisely, but a daemon that slipped into your unguarded mind and took up residence in your body.
It may be that xenophobia is a local optimum for humanity in 40K. But technology is explicitly mystical in that universe. Imagine how many fewer problems they would have with their enemies if their stuff all worked, and they had more of it.
It's like bringing a 1000 pt army to a 500 pt skirmish. Every time.
IIRC that actually did happen a couple of times in that universe. The answers were usually "A Machine God eats the factory planet" and "Necrons". So, the outcome was... not good.
On the other hand, the T'au have a pretty good handle on their tech, and they're improving it all the time, so maybe the humans could take some lessons from them. On the third hand (*), the T'au as a whole seem to be immune to Chaos corruption, which is a luxury that the humans do not enjoy.
(*) Or tail or tentacle or what have you.
Mechadendrite, thank you very much.
Is there some research corroborating this quote? I have a lot of useless knowledge but it doesn't seem to stop me from accumulating useful knowledge. It does make sense to avoid spending time and energy on acquiring useless knowledge, though.
If this is a question about causality, I would assume not. Sherlock Holmes was eccentric to the point of insanity and made up all sorts of funny wrong things.
In reality, it seems like in general exercising the brain improves its function on several dimensions. Also, relevant silly article about brain memory capacity
It's less about making things up and more about then-current ideas that are now outdated.
There are more of them in Holmes stories, like like the idea that you can tell a man's intelligence from his skull shape/size (phrenology).
As I understand it (not that I can quote any research), knowledge helps gain more knowledge due to how memory works; it's easier to remember something if you have previous ideas to which to "link" or associate the new ones (and those links don't have to be within the same domain of knowledge). Also, wouldn't it be true that the more things you understand, the more likely you are to have a shorter inferential distance to whatever new ideas you come across?
I read this as concerning organization instead of capacity.
relevant: Your inner Google
I had a different interpretation. To me, this sounded more like a warning against bad personal epistemic hygiene and about the tradeoff between epistemic and instrumental rationality, not what happens when you reach the upper bound of your memory capacity. Now that I think about it, your interpretation is probably closer to what Doyle had in mind (what with his 19th century pop-psychology and all).
In the book this quote is in, Holmes uses it to justify refusing to remember that the Earth goes around the Sun.
I'll bite: how am I supposed to judge (or predict) the usefulness of facts when I first see them, in time to avoid storing the useless ones?
I think the closest we get to this is that every time we remember something, we also edit that memory, thus (if we are rational enough) tossing out the useless or unreliable parts or at least flagging them as such. If this faculty worked better I might find it a convincing argument for "intelligent design," but the real thing, like so much else in human beings, is so haphazard that it reinforces my lack of belief in that idea.
-Pierre de Beaumarchais (and usually incorrectly attributed to Voltaire)
Is this about the seductive power of music to fool people into believing implausible things? If not, what is its rationality?
I would take it to be about art in general rather than music specifically. It's socially acceptable for works of art to support a particular viewpoint - and try to convert their consumers to it - without supplying much evidence to show that it's actually true.
One example that will probably ring true with LWers is the strong lesson in lots of fiction that following one's "heart" is a better (more moral, or more likely to lead to success) course of action than following one's "head".
A similar principle might be: any popular game with poor plot, balance, gameplay, etc. has good graphics.
Imagine you find yourself in a conversation with a room full of other high school kids, most of whom are as full of confusion and self-doubt as high school kids typically are, and many of whom have found solace, self-identification, and reassurance in popular music.
In that context, this quote is far too stupid to be spoken or sung.
I think they mostly forgave me eventually.
-Voltaire, Cato
But which of these more accurately represents his "actual preferences", to the extent that such a thing even exists?
Not only is "actual preferences" ill-defined, but so is "accurately represent." So let me try and operationalize this a bit.
We have someone with a set of preferences that turn out to be mutually exclusive in the world they live in.
We can in principle create a procedure for sorting their preferences into categories such that each preference falls into at least one category and all the preferences in a category can (at least in principle) be realized in that world at the same time.
So suppose we've done this, and it turns out they have two categories A and B, where A includes those preferences Cato describes as "a fit of melancholy."
I would say that their "actual" preferences = (A + B). It's not realizable in the world, but it's nevertheless their preference. So your question can be restated: does A or B more accurately represent (A + B)?
There doesn't seem to be any nonarbitrary way to measure the extent of A, B, and (A+B) to determine this directly. I mean, what would you measure? The amount of brain matter devoted to representing all three? The number of lines of code required to represent them in some suitably powerful language?
One common approach is to look at their revealed preferences as demonstrated by the choices they make. Given an A-satisfying and a B-satisfying choice that are otherwise equivalent (and constructing such an exercise is left as an exercise to the class), which do they choose? This is tricky in this case, since the whole premise here is that their revealed preferences are inconsistent over time, but you could in principle measure their revealed preferences at multiple different times and weight the results accordingly (assuming for simplicity that all preference-moments are identical in weight).
When you were done doing all of that, you'd know whether A > B, B>A, or A=B.
It's not in the least clear to me what good knowing that would do you. I suspect that this sort of analysis is not actually what you had in mind.
A more common approach is to decide which of A and B I endorse, and to assert that the one I endorse is his actual preference. E.g., if I endorse choosing to live over choosing to die, then I endorse B, and I therefore assert that B is his actual preference. But this is not emotionally satisfying when I say it baldly like that. Fortunately, there are all kinds of ways to conceal the question-begging nature of this approach, even from oneself.
I would instead ask "What preferences would this agent have, in a counterfactual universe in which they were fully-informed and rational but otherwise identical?".
Quoting a forum post from a couple years ago...
"The problem with trying to extrapolate what a person would want with perfect information is, perfect information is a lot of fucking information. The human brain can't handle that much information, so if you want your extrapolatory homunculus to do anything but scream and die like someone put into the Total Perspective Vortex, you need to enhance its information processing capabilities. And once you've reached that point, why not improve its general intelligence too, so it can make better decisions? Maybe teach it a little bit about heuristics and biases, to help it make more rational choices. And you know it wouldn't really hate blacks except for those pesky emotions that get in the way, so lets throw those out the window. You know what, let's just replace it with a copy of me, I want all the cool things anyway.
Truly, the path of a utilitarian is a thorny one. That's why I prefer a whimsicalist moral philosophy. Whimsicalism is a humanism!"
The sophisticated reader presented with a slippery slope argument like that one first checks whether there really is a force driving us in a particular direction, that makes the metaphorical terrain a slippery slope rather than just a slippery field, and secondly they check whether there are any defensible points of cleavage in the metaphorical terrain that could be used to build a fence and stop the slide at some point.
The slippery slope argument you are quoting, when uprooted and placed in this context, seems to me to fail both tests. There's no reason at all to descend progressively into the problems described, and even if there was you could draw a line and say "we're just going to inform our mental model of any relevant facts we know that it doesn't, and fix any mental processes our construct has that are clearly highly irrational".
You haven't given us a link but going by the principle of charity I imagine that what you've done here is take a genuine problem with building a weakly God-like friendly AI and tried to transplant the argument into the context of intervening in a suicide attempt, where it doesn't belong.
I think this quote unfairly trivializes the subjectively (and often objectively) harsh lives suicidal people go through.
As a 911 Operator, I have spoken to hundreds of suicidal people at their very lowest moment (often with a weapon in hand). In my professional judgment, the quote is accurate for a large number of cases (obviously, there are exceptions).
I have read that a majority of people who survive suicide attempts end up glad that they did not succeed (although I can no longer remember and thus cannot vouch for the source.) A somewhat alarming proportion of my own acquaintances have attempted suicide though, and all except for one so far have attested that this is the case for them.
There are many people who want to die. There are few who are willing to commit suicide to do it.
I think this quote is objectively accurate:
In other words, if you ever think you want to kill yourself, there's a 90% chance you're wrong. Behave accordingly.
That isn't what the quote tells you. It is evidence that you could be wrong but certainly doesn't make you 90% likely to be wrong.
Relevant discussion.
-Randall Munroe, xkcd
-Doctor Who, Season 5, Episode 5
I love the quote. The Doctor is badass. But ultimately this seems to be a quote about misusing the word 'impossible' - totally out of place in this thread!
I see it as taking the Outside View on impossibility. Of course, in real life it usually takes more than a few minutes, but in the Whoniverse it is not unreasonable. Also, asking "How impossible?" seems to me like a good question in some cases.
So long as it is kept in mind that "How impossible?" is merely a more polite and less coherent way of replying "Bullshit. How difficult is it really?".
I believe it's a bit of metahumor/sarcasm aimed at this plot device:
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/MillionToOneChance
Aretae
There's also the subjectivism of taste, sometimes known as consumer sovereignty (the idea, from David Friedman's <i>The Machinery of Freedom</i>, that a person's own good is defined as whatever he says it is). Not believing in that leads to outbreaks of senseless and counterproductive nannyism, whether carried out alone or with the help of authorities.
I assume that what you mean by "whatever he says it is" is whatever preferences his choices reveal, not literally what he says it is.
Believing that a person's good is literally what they say it is can just as easily lead to "nannyism", if we decided to prevent people from acting against their own good.
-- Warhammer 40,000
Normally I consider asking "omg why the downvotes boo hoo" to be crass, but in this case I'm genuinely curious: why do you guys think that this quote is inapplicable ?
The quote denies the possibility of Progress or Improvement.
I am not sure what "Progress" or "Improvement" mean in this context, but I interpret the quote to mean, "Instead of unfounded hope, try and get some reasonable expectations, or else you're going to end up being disappointed". I could be wrong, though. In any case, thanks for replying !
Just as a matter of precise use of language (i.e. pedantry): no it doesn't. It merely says that it is impossible to be disappointed without first having hope.
Given that Warhammer 40K is a dystopia of the first degree, the natural reading of the quote is that disappointment is an inevitable consequence of hope.
It does sound like the sort of thing a Nurglite evangelist would proclaim, but the problem is that "disappointment is an inevitable consequence of hope" is simply not what the words mean.
Warhammer 40K is one of those settings that is highly is open to interpretation. My interpretation is that it's in a situation where things could be better and could be worse, victory and defeat are both very much on the cards, and hope guided by cold realism is one of the main factors that might tip the balance towards the first outcome. I consider it similar in that regard to the Cthulhu mythos, and for that matter to real life.
Well, I liked the quote, and you have my upvote. It says to me, stop wasting time hoping things will turn out right (and contrapositively, worrying that things will turn out wrong) and get down to fixing the problems.
Am I reading too much into it? I don't think so. I don't care, either. It made me smile because it showcases a big part of my world-view.
Thanks for the upvote; I interpret the quote in a similar way.
I downvoted it because it is meaningless noise - "hope" is the first step to anything, without hope a person would just sit there in an apathetic puddle. Without hope, a person won't even try to find the "reasonable expectations" you mentioned in a latter response. Everything is founded on "hope".
From "If money doesn't make you happy, then you probably aren't spending it right" by Elizabeth W. Dunn, Daniel T. Gilbert, Timothy D. Wilson in the Journal of Consumer Psychology. (http://dunn.psych.ubc.ca/files/2011/04/Journal-of-consumer-psychology.pdf)
The title of the book is a good candidate for a December quote, in and of itself.
(article)
~ Mencius Moldbug
Saruman, in this image at A Tiny Revolution.
~ Mortimer J. Adler, How to Read a Book
~ Randall Munroe, xkcd #240: Dream Girl
Except that in this case it did.
Just reading that maxed out my GDA for fuzzies.
What made it real was (among other things) Randall posting that comic. He wanted the meetup, and chose that method to publicise it.
Wanting something isn't sufficient: desire is a force that acts upon you, not on the universe.
Knutson and Tuleya, Journal of Climate, 2005.
~Epictetus
Better to leave them well-instructed and rich, surely?
you can trade money for goodness of instruction by e.g. hiring tutors
Only if you are wise enough to know that, and wise enough to tell a good tutor from a poor one
Yeah, at some point you have to be wise enough to listen to Epictetus, too. Maybe you could get him to recommend you a tutor.
Reminds me of Sartre's talk of despair and abandonment. In the end there is no way to avoid taking responsibility for our actions. Oh well!
This is rather self-serving: the Stoics in general were renowned (and well-paid) teachers. (More practically, I've seen some articles suggesting that, in the US, the cost of some majors now outweighs the monetary benefits. The cost of education should at least be considered.)
-- Terry Pratchett, The Wee Free Men
And they'll be beaten in turn by people who were in the right place at the right time, or won the genetic lottery. A little luck can make up for a lot of laziness, and working hard and learning things can just leave you digging ditches and able to quote every Simpsons episode verbatim.
Thankfully for Mr. Pratchett, you can't influence the genetic lottery or the luck fairy, so his is still valid advice. In fact, one could see "trust in yourself" et al. as invitations to "do or do not, there is no try", whereas "work hard, learn hard and don't be lazy" supports the virtue of scholarship as well as that of "know when to give up". Miss Tick is being eminently practical, and "do or do not", while also an important virtue, requires way more explanation before the student can understand it.
Yeah. "Do or do not" / "believe in yourself" should either be administered on a case-by-case basis by a discerning mentor, or packaged with the full instruction manual.
http://www.engadget.com/2011/12/01/geeks-lose-minds-recreate-first-level-of-super-mario-land-with/
Wow. That's absolutely bonkers. And impressive. XKCD almost seems realistic now!
And the worst thing is they don't use a piston array! Making a scrolling wall of blocks is fairly easy within Minecraft and would've saved them the trouble of manually shifting all their blocks every single frame. That's easily an order of magnitude less work, and can be re-used for other stop-motion movies.
Their excuse? "We dont have the smarts"(sic). Sigh.
Its almost a new type of super-stimulus, where rather than being extraordinarily entertaining its extraordinarily difficult.
-Tooby and Cosmides, emphasis theirs. It occurred to someone on the Less Wrong IRC channel how good this is an isomorphism of, "You have asked a wrong question."
The conversation in question.
The width. Changing the width makes a bigger change in the area than changing the length does. (By convention, the width is defined as the smaller of the two dimensions of the rectangle.)
You have resolved the question to the nearest available sane question but that isn't the answer to the question itself and does not make the question valid.
Come to think of it I am somewhat dubious with answering "is the area of this 1km by 1m rectangle more the 1km or the 1m?" with "the 1m". That just doesn't seem right.
Hmmm...
"No."
Is that better?
Only if you're augmenting/cutting by a fixed length.
If you're using a proportion (e.g. cut either the length or the width in half) then they're equivalent.
I could also meaninglessly answer that the length is more important, as it will always be equal or bigger.
the key to finding a wrong question is finding that the answer doesn't help the person who asked it.
That sounds like less of a wrong question and more of a "right question with surprising (low prior) answer". As far as the asker knew, the answer could have turned out to be, "Genes produce the same organism phenotype across virtually all environments, so genes are more important because changing them is much more likely to change the expressed phenotype than changing the environment." (and indeed, life would not be life if genes could not force some level of environment-invariance, thereby acting as a control system for a low-entropy island)
I don't see what's wrong with answering this question with "neither [i.e., they're equal], because they jointly determine phenotype, as independent changes in either have the same chance of affecting phenotype".
An example of a wrong question, by contrast, would be something like, "Which path did the electron really take?" because it posits an invalid ontology of the world as a pre-requisite. The question about phenotypes doesn't do that.
Since my sibling reply got voted up a lot, I want to follow up: it seems that not only is the question not wrong, the "dissolving" answer is itself wrong, or at least very misleading. (Naturally, I have to tread cautiously, since I'm not an Expert in this area.)
As I said in my other reply, the defining characteristic of life is its ability to maintain a low-entropy island against the entropizing forces of nature. So there must be some range of environments in which an organism (via genes) is able to produce the same phenotype regardless of where its environment falls within that range. In effect, the genes allow the phenotype to be "screened off" (d-separated, whatever) from its environment (again, within limits).
A thing that truly allows the environment equal influence in its final form as the thing itself (as suggested by the T&C answer) is not what we mean by "life". It's the hot water that eventually cools to a temperature somewhere between its current temperature and that of its initial environment. It's the compressed gas molecules in the corner of a chamber that eventually spread out evenly throughout the chamber. It is, in short, not the kind of self-replicating, low entropy island we associate with life, and so has no basic units thereof, be they genes or memes.
The organism needs to successfully thrive and reproduce within that range. Sometimes this means tailoring its phenotype to the environment it finds itself in.
Of course.
But imagine a world in which environment truly was more determining than genes. Every animal born in a swamp would be a frog (no matter what its parents were) and every animal born in a tree would be a bird. Perhaps coloration or some other trait might be heritable — blue birds who move to swamps give rise to little blue tadpoles — but the majority of phenotypic features would be governed by the environment in which the organism is born and develops.
In our world, all we know about X is that it is a phenotypic feature, then we should expect it is more likely to be stable under different environments than to be stable under different genotypes. Features must owe more (on the aggregate) to genes than to environment. If it were otherwise, then we would not talk about species! We know we are not in the swamp-birds-have-tadpoles world.
When people talk about genes vs. environment, they usually aren't really talking about all features. They're usually talking about some particular, politically interesting set of features of humans ...
--Arthur Schopenhauer
This seems obviously true, but why is it true?
There's not point being annoyed at nature, but a precommitment to revenge is useful.
Incidentally, I would point out that I'm pretty sure I've read of psychology experiments where self-inflicted pain is rated as less painful than the same electrical shocks inflicted by another person.
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2008). The sting of intentional pain. Psychological Science, 19(12), 1260-1262. pdf
Many thanks for the reference!
I wonder what would happen where the pain is something like a needle-stick in a blood donation: Inflicted by someone else, but with the consent of the person experiencing it. Presumably the element of malice wouldn't be present...
-Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation
Euripides, Helen
We practice rationality because we don't have a "sense" of what not to believe, or at least not a reliable one. The closest thing is the absurdity heuristic, which is very hit-and-miss.
(McKay & Dennett 2009)
Isn't pure mathematics a counterexample?
Each theorem is grounded in axioms (although, one is often working many, many levels above the most basic axioms). And each axiom is independent of physical reality, so it doesn't have a definite truth value (as long as it is not inconsistent with itself).
Thomas Carew
Richard Scholz
Gerry Spence (emphasis his)
<blockquote> The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The second best time is now. </blockquote>
African proverb
Whoops, didn't mean to retract that. The quote is "The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The second best time is now." - African proverb
For blockquotes, put a > at the beginning of the paragraph.
--I.J. Good (as quoted in "The Problem of Thinking Too Much" by Persi Diaconis)
-- Dutch proverb
Can someone please explain this one to me? I'm just getting "living things shape their environment", which while inspirational doesn't have much to do with rationality.
Possibly it's making a subtle equivocation between "earth" and "land", that is, the Dutch obtained a lot of what is now the Netherlands by extracting underwater land from the sea (or used to, something like that). It's not just saying that the Dutch "created their nation" in the sense of laws and whatnot, but actually "made" the land for it.
My guess, anyway.
That's the interpretation given in this French children's book, where I first encountered the proverb.
That's also how this Dutchwoman interprets it. But of course, while it literally refers to the creation of polders, the figurative meaning is 'faith might have its place, but science and hard work are what solve problems', like PhilosophyTutor said. (With a little bit of 'Gee, aren't we Dutch GREAT?' thrown in. ;p)
It looks to me like a more pacifistic version of "God made man, but Samuel Colt made them equal". Which could be taken to mean "faith might have its place, but science and hard work are what solve problems". Both proverbs are open to other interpretations of course.
-- Finn's Note, from "The Real You"
An example of working precommitment (to a plan that may involve forgetting the plan).
"Clear language engenders clear thought, and clear thought is the most important benefit of education." - Richard Mitchell, The Graves of Academe
Anatole France, Le livre de mon ami (1885)
Anatole France is probably better known for saying, "La majestueuse égalité des lois, qui interdit au riche comme au pauvre de coucher sous les ponts, de mendier dans les rues et de voler du pain" - or, in English, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."
I can't see how this is a rationality quote. This would imply that humans have a hard time controlling their actions. How else could someone who thinks wisely act in an absurd fashion? Isn't rationality about how to overcome that humans don't think wisely?
I read the quote as remarking on the problem of implementation - people often can enunciate the optimal course of action for themselves in their present situation (e.g. I should be working on my paper right now) without this enunciation having the slightest effect on their behavior. Therefore, since the benefits of rationality only accrue to those whose behavior is rational, no art of rationality is complete that does not deal with implementation.
I love how English/French translations have so many cognates! (You could even up that one a little more by using "sagely" instead of "wisely".)
I actually have a mild distrust of cognates - I don't think the connotations are necessarily preserved.
I agree, especially with French. (I've seen people translate "dialogue" from French using the cognate, and it sounds like middle-manager-speak.) Didn't mean to criticize your choice, just something I've found neat.
Also true of translated terms in general...
Fritz Zwicky, Morphological Astronomy
-- Joseph de Maistre (St. Petersburg Dialogues, No. 7)
[citation needed]
It doesn't seem at all uncommon for someone from domain A to present a problem and for someone from domain B to immediately reply "Oh, we have just the perfect tool for that in my field!".
A lot of things don't seem too uncommon
What's missing is indication that the physicist is wrong. Cows are spheres, right?
In my experience this is true given a definition of "complete fool" that encompasses a majority of the population, provided the person supplying quick answers isn't also a fool.
Some years ago I would have agreed with you, but nowadays I believe this attitude is mistaken. In most cases, quick answers will at least miss some important aspects of the problem. I think de Maistre is quite right to emphasize that it's safe to rely on quick answers only when the person raising the concern is otherwise known to be extremely foolish.
Related xkcd.
I actually expected to see this one.
They are all variations on the same theme, aren't they?
This gives, by implication, a detector for absolute folly: the condition of believing that something is a very problematic question, when in fact it has a quick, consistent, explanatory answer available to those who have considered it only briefly or not at all.
It doesn't necessarily follow that it's a highly accurate detector, though. If only a small minority of reasonable people are in this condition, while complete fools are commonly in this condition but their number is still much smaller than this minority of reasonable people, then the above quote would be true and yet your proposed test would be very weak.
A fascinating question would be how strong this test actually is, and how it varies with different subjects.
I have on numerous occasions presented problems to others, after giving them careful thought, and had them reply instantly with the correct answer. Usually the next question is "why didn't I think of that?" which sometimes has an obvious answer and sometimes doesn't.
My favorite remains Eliezer asking me the question "why don't you just use log likelihood?" I still don't have a good answer to why I needed the question!
I don't think that de Maistre's "quick answers" category is supposed to include answers based on sound expertise.
People are often confused about questions to which an expert in the relevant area will give a quick and reliably correct answer. However, an expert capable of answering a technical question competently is not someone who has "considered [the question] only briefly or not at all": he is in fact someone who has spent a great deal of time and effort (along with possessing the necessary talent) on understanding a broad class of questions that subsumes the one being asked.
-- Road sign in Griffin, Georgia, showing that sometimes it's good to have some distance between map and area.
--PZ Myers
--The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
I never thought I'd see a reference to my favorite movie on Less Wrong. Although...the decision theory involved in navigating a Mexican standoff could be interesting.
Motorhead - God Was Never on Your Side
On YouTube.
Formatting note: You can do
a line break
without
a paragraph break
by putting two spaces at the end of a line.
Thank you, edited. Is this the reason for the downvoting, or is there something else?
Maybe people just don't like it. FWIW, I upvoted it.
I didn't (up/down)vote (the grandparent) but I imagine it's a combination of signalling concerns and a distaste for anything resembling theism.
Thank you for sharing your considerations.
I re-analyzed my motivations and honestly I don't think I was trying to signal. There's a small possibility that part of the motivation for the post was a sort of counter-signaling ("Hey, look at me, I listen to Motorhead!"), but for what I can reconstruct I honestly thought it was a good rationality quote. I may overvalue the quote because I like the song, of course, but I still think it has some good content. While the focus here is on God, the message that can be taken from it is, in my opinion, broader.
“Before enlightenment; chop wood, carry water. After enlightenment; chop wood, carry water.” - Zen saying
A warning that not all hyperrationality is beneficial.
Or a warning that the Zen notion of enlightenment won't let you automate menial tasks you dislike.
...or another way of saying "it all adds up to normal."
Or at least, that at some point, if you want to improve your lot, you need to leave off thinking long enough to build, buy, or improve some gadget or agreement that will actually help. Labor-saving tech really does equal progress.
Mind is a machine for jumping to conclusions - Daniel Kahneman
Let's go for two-in-one this time:
---"Culture in Economics and the Culture of Economics: Raquel Fernández in Conversation with The Straddler"
So what would it take to make some reliable economic predictions -- however simple or easy? How far away is the field from being able to do any useful predictive work at all?
I would point out that it is perfectly possible to be a worse predictor than a random or max-ent predictor; if all economics does is - per the quote - remove our (Marxist/Communist/socialist/Keynesian/mercantilist/Maoist/Catholic/...) delusions that we can improve on the normal workings of the economy, it will have done us a useful service indeed. Aside from the very simplest predictions relating to supply-and-demand, obviously.
I don't get your jump there - we don't need to be able to forecast weather to be able to build a roof to shield ourself from rain. The same way, even if economists have no ability to forecast the market, we may still be able to devise social rules to soften the negative consequences of a market crash. Or we may not, but it's a different issue.
I also don't get what you call "normal workings" of the economy. Even most of the libertarian I know about still want to enforce and protect private property, using external force to do so. So they are already distorting the "normal working". If you want to use public force to ban stealing, then you're already thinking you can improve on the "normal workings" of the economy.
You certainly do need to be able to forecast weather to justify building a roof to shield yourself from rain! As opposed to blizzards, the monsoon season, sand storms, or any of the infinite varieties of weather which do or do not exist in your particular location.
The normal workings are set by long tradition and experience and local experiments (see the Austrians like Hayek), which is data-driven stuff completely opposed to the top-down economic interventions I contrasted with.
Point taken, but my question stands: how far are we from improving on max-ent predictions?
Would you taboo "normal," please? I'm curious as to exactly what you mean.
I have no idea. To a considerable extent, economics shouldn't be able to make many good predictions by the nature of the material; see efficient markets and "Markets are Anti-Inductive".
The set of idiosyncratic norms and traditions developed over centuries by small groups solving economic problems, which frequently maximize value even while appearing either impossible or arbitrary; this is an old vein of libertarian economic thought, although the most recent work I've read is Seeing like a State (pretty good).
-- Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning
-- Bryan Caplan
— Alexander Grothendieck (attributed; couldn't find a reliable source)
-- Kiwi Dave
--Hokusai and Hiroshige
It took me a long time to figure out this poem isn't about a recovering alcoholic.
~ Girl Genius
(They're actually talking about fantasy fiction, but the principle applies to real life as well.)
(Duplicate and not verbatim)
Retracted. Thanks and sorry.
"The Latest Toughs" by Okkervil River http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tziQcj4XIYw
-John Lennon on leaving a line of retreat
Not actually a dupe, to my surprise. (Personally, I would've linked to 'Joy in the Merely Real' or something; lines of retreat doesn't seem that relevant.)
-- Paul Graham, "The Age of the Essay" (http://www.paulgraham.com/essay.html)
-Probably not Henry Ford
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/08/henry_ford_never_said_the_fast.html
Well, that makes sense. They've panicked earlier, when the plan was announced.
Tom Lehrer, "That's Mathematics"
(If one were so inclined, one could give a quasi-rationalist commentary on practically every lyric in that song.)
--Marjorie Perloff, Wittgenstein's Ladder; apparently of the many attempts, the one referred to did not actually have British backing, although some did eg. the Oster Conspiracy or Operation Foxley.
(This is the full and original quote; the emphasis is on the section which is usually paraphrased as, "What is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic...if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?")