James_Miller comments on [SEQ RERUN] The Amazing Virgin Pregnancy - Less Wrong

3 Post author: MinibearRex 04 December 2011 04:11AM

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Comment author: James_Miller 04 December 2011 06:29:00AM *  3 points [-]

Shouldn't the fact that so many smart people believe in God cause EY to give non-trivial weight to the possibility that his brain and those of his fellow atheists have a flaw which blinds then from seeing the truth of religion?

Let's say a massive number of really smart people have thought a huge amount about proposition X and have concluded that it is true. Regardless of your evaluation of X and your evaluation of how other people evaluate X doesn't a rationalist still have to believe that the chance of X being true is non-trivially greater than zero?

Comment author: lessdazed 04 December 2011 06:50:45AM 2 points [-]

doesn't a rationalist still have to believe that the chance of X being true is non-trivially greater than zero?

http://lesswrong.com/lw/jr/how_to_convince_me_that_2_2_3/

http://lesswrong.com/lw/qv/the_rhythm_of_disagreement/

Be less ready to disagree with a supermajority than a mere majority; be less ready to disagree outside than inside your expertise; always pay close attention to the object-level arguments; never let the debate become about tribal status.

Comment author: Gust 04 December 2011 04:58:33PM 1 point [-]

I think the fact that the Mind Projection Fallacy is a really strong bias in humans significantly decreases the weight of that possibility. Smart people think it may be true because that sounds like the easiest explanation, for a human, not because they actually thought a lot about it from a strictly rational point-of-view.

That's some kind of general counter-argument against "trust the majority", I think. When you learn that the majority has some kind of bias that supports its belief, you should decrease the strength you assign to the evidence "the majority thinks it's true". P(A|B)/P(A|!B) is small.