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DanielLC comments on Are multiple uploads equivilant to extra life? - Less Wrong
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I don't think so. Consider a few more options:
C) One simulation of you is run for 100 years, on a computer with transistors twice the normal size. D) One simulation of you is run at half speed for 200 years.
Those would seem similar to B, and are intuitively no different than A. That being said, an option similar to C:
E) One simulation of you is run for 100 years on a quantum waveform twice the amplitude.
Given the Born probabilities, this is not only better than option A, but four times better.
I largely agree, but please note that B might be preferable to A and possibly C and D because of considerations of robustness. In the event that one of the two simulations in B is destroyed, you are left with something very close to the isomorphic A rather than nothing at all.
I am assuming p(both simulations are destroyed | B) < p(the simulation is destroyed | A), and also that there is no intrinsic disutility in destroying a simulation provided that other identical simulations exist.
I interpreted it as a question of utility, not expected utility. The expected utility of attempting B is higher because if you fail, at least you get A.