Nick Bostrom has a paper relating to this.

If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2006): 185-200]

ETA: So (presuming Bostrom's argument is correct, which it seems to be to me) if you ran two identical copies of your upload, there would be two separate copies of you experiencing the same things. Whether or not you should prefer this doesn't have an objective answer: it depends on whether or not you'd value that.