I think yes, for two (weak) reasons:

1) Suppose some number of copies of me (all identical with each other) will be made that will be happy, and that some number (all identical to each other) will be unhappy. It seems that I prefer the happier proportion to be larger, all else being equal.

2) If Tegmark metaphysics is true and it doesn't matter how many copies there are, then we should be surprised to find ourselves in a simple universe; Dust Theory basically obtains. But I'm looking at my hands and they don't seem to have turned into marshmallows.

My OTHER intuition is that asking whether identical copies "cancel out" or not violates the anti-zombie principle, which I think is generally poorly understood here, with people taking it to mean "nobody is a zombie" instead of the less confusing "everyone is a zombie." Which is how things would have been phrased had analytic discourse not made a wrong turn somewhere back, I think.