Yes, agreed... for a program running in a black box to convince me that it was the same kind of person that I am, one of the things it would have to do is report a first-person experience. (That's also a criterion I apply to the programs running on humanoid brains all around me.)
So when someone asserts hypothetically that X is a convincing emulation of a person, I assume hypothetically that one of the things X can do is report a first-person experience.
What I'm not understanding about your discussion here is that you seem to believe that even if X is a convincing emulation of a person, it's not really a person... but when you get into the details of that, you instead end up talking about how X hypothetically fails to be a convincing emulation.
So, I guess my question is: do you believe that it's possible in principle for X to be a person if X is, for example, a program running on a computer? If so, what evidence would it take to convince you that a particular X was in fact a person? If not, what evidence would it take to convince you you were wrong?
My own answers are: yes, and its ability to carry on a sufficiently sophisticated conversation with me.
Yes, agreed... for a program running in a black box to convince me that it was the same kind of person that I am, one of the things it would have to do is report a first-person experience. (That's also a criterion I apply to the programs running on humanoid brains all around me.)
I basically agree with what you are saying here, that if in protracted conversation the box can convince me it is conscious then I'll conditionally afford it some large fraction of the consideration I give to meat-people.
The criteria I apply to the "programs running on hu...
Suppose I have choice between the following:
A) One simulation of me is run for me 100 years, before being deleted.
B) Two identical simulations of me are run for 100 years, before being deleted.
Is the second choice preferable to the first? Should I be willing to pay more to have multiple copies of me simulated, even if those copies will have the exact same experiences?
Forgive me if this question has been answered before. I have Googled to no avail.