I don't think the analogy fails, but I do see a couple narrow objections.
1) If you believe that in being tasked with simulating you, the other people are made unable to live out their lives as they wish, then we may be saving them through your death. In this case, I would say that it is still death, and still bad in that respect, but possibly not on balance. If those people are there by their own free will, and feel that simulating TheChineseDave is their calling in life, then the morality plays out differently.
2) If you pause the experiment but do not destroy the data, such that people (the same or others) may pick up where they left off, then it is closer to cryonic suspension than death. To make it truly analogous, we might require destruction of their notes (or at least enough of them to prohibit resumption).
Aside from those, I cannot see any relevant difference between the components making up TheChineseDave and those making up TheOtherDave - in both cases, it's the system that is conscious. Is there anything you think I have overlooked?
Nope, that's pretty much it. #1, in particular, seems important.
Suppose I have choice between the following:
A) One simulation of me is run for me 100 years, before being deleted.
B) Two identical simulations of me are run for 100 years, before being deleted.
Is the second choice preferable to the first? Should I be willing to pay more to have multiple copies of me simulated, even if those copies will have the exact same experiences?
Forgive me if this question has been answered before. I have Googled to no avail.