Yes, in that hypothetical scenario, I would feel that sending all the people inside home and ending the experiment would constitute killing a person. (Or perhaps suspending that person's life, if it is possible to pick up TheChineseDave where it left off, which it seems like it ought to be.)

I think the moral component of emulation and how we get there needs to be explored. I may think killing an 18 year old genius is ethical if he dies incidental to my saving 700 lives on a crashing airliner in some easy to construct hypothetical. But the point is his death is a large moral value that is being weighed in the moral economy.

If disbanding the chinese room destroys a consciousness (or "suspends" it likely forever), it is essentially the same moral value as killing a meat-instantiated person.

To develop emulations, I hypothesize (and will happily bet in a prediction market) that MANY MANY partial successes partial failures will be achieved before the technology is on line and good. This means there will be a gigantic moral/ethical question around doing the research and development to get things working. Will the broken-but-conscious versions be left alive for thousands of subjective years of suffering? Will they be "euthanized?"

Morality should be difficult for rationalists: it is not fundamentally a rational thing. Morality starts with an assumption, whether it is that suffering defined as X should be minimized or that some particular set of features (coherent extrapolated volition) should be maximized. For me, various scales and versions of mechanical consciousness challenge conventional morality, which of course evolved when there was only one copy of each person, it was in meat, and it lasted for a finite time. It makes sense that conventional morality should be challenged as we contemplate consciousnesses that violate all of these conditions, just as classical mechanics is challenged by very fast objects and very small objects in physics.