For my own part, I share your #1 and #2, don't share your #3 (that is, I'd rather Omega not reproduce the bad stuff, but if they're going to do so, it makes no real difference to me whether they reproduce the good stuff as well)
One thing that makes me inclined towards #3 is the possibility that the multiverse is constantly reproducing my life over and over again, good and bad. I do not think that I would consider it devastatingly bad news if it turns out that the Many-Worlds interpretation is correct.
If I really believed that repeated bad experiences could not ever be compensated for by repeated good ones, I would consider the Many Worlds Interpretation to be the worst news ever, since there were tons of me out in the multiverse having a mix of good and bad experiences, but the good ones "don't count" because they already happened somewhere else. But I don't consider it bad news. I don't think that if there was a machine that could stop the multiverse from splitting that I would pay to have it built.
One way to explain my preferences in this regard would be that I believe that repeated "good stuff" can compensate for repeated "bad stuff," but that it can't compensate for losing brand new "good stuff" or experiencing brand new "bad stuff."
However, I am not certain about this. There may be some other explanation for my preferences. Another possibility that I think is likely is that I think that repeated "good stuff" only loses its value for copies that have a strong causal connection to the current me. Other mes who exist somewhere out in the multiverse have no connection to this version of me whatsoever, so my positive experiences don't detract from their identical ones. But copies that I pay to have created (or to not be) are connected to me in such a fashion, so I (and they) do feel that their repeated experiences are less valuable.
This second explanation seems a strong contender as well, since I already have other moral intuitions in regards to causal connection (for instance, if there was a Matrioshka brain full of quintillions environmentalists in a part of the multiverse so far off they will never interact with us, I would not consider their preferences to be relevant when forming environmental policy, but I would consider the preferences of environmentalists here on Earth right now to be relevant). This relates to that "separability" concept we discussed a while ago.
Or maybe both of these explanations are true. I'm not sure.
Also, I'm curious, why are you indifferent in case 4? I think I might not have explained it clearly. What I was going for was that Omega say "I'm making a copy of you in a bad time of your life. I can either not do it at all, or extend the copy's lifespan so that it is now a copy of a portion of your life that had both good and bad moments. Both options cost $10." I am saying that I think I might be indifferent about what I spend $10 on in that case.
Yup, that makes sense, but doesn't seem to describe my own experience.
For my own part, I think the parts of my psyche that judge the kinds of negative scenarios we're talking about use a different kind of evaluation than the parts that judge the kinds of positive scenarios we're talking about.
I seem to treat the "bad stuff" as bad for its own sake... avoiding torture feels worth doing, period end of sentence. But the "good stuff" feels more contingent, more instrumental, feels more like it's worth doing only because it leads to... som...
Suppose I have choice between the following:
A) One simulation of me is run for me 100 years, before being deleted.
B) Two identical simulations of me are run for 100 years, before being deleted.
Is the second choice preferable to the first? Should I be willing to pay more to have multiple copies of me simulated, even if those copies will have the exact same experiences?
Forgive me if this question has been answered before. I have Googled to no avail.