Yup, that makes sense, but doesn't seem to describe my own experience.
For my own part, I think the parts of my psyche that judge the kinds of negative scenarios we're talking about use a different kind of evaluation than the parts that judge the kinds of positive scenarios we're talking about.
I seem to treat the "bad stuff" as bad for its own sake... avoiding torture feels worth doing, period end of sentence. But the "good stuff" feels more contingent, more instrumental, feels more like it's worth doing only because it leads to... something. This is consistent with my experience of these sorts of thought experiments more generally... it's easier for me to imagine "pure" negative value (e.g., torture, suffering, etc in isolation.) than "pure" positive value (e.g., joy, love, happiness, satisfaction in isolation). It's hard for me to imagine some concrete thing that I would actually trade for a year of torture, for example, though in principle it seems like some such thing ought to exist.
And it makes some sense that there would be a connection between how instrumental something feels, and how I think about the prospect of repeating it. If torture feels bad for its own sake, then when I contemplate repetitions of the same torture, it makes sense that I would "add up the badness" in my head... and if good stuff doesn't feel good for its own sake, it makes sense that I wouldn't "add up the goodness" in my head in the same way.
WRT #4, what I'm saying is that copying the good moments feels essentially valueless to me, while copying the bad moments has negative value. So I'm being offered a choice between "bad thing + valueless thing" and "bad thing", and I don't seem to care. (That said, I'd probably choose the former, cuz hey, I might be wrong.)
I think I understand your viewpoint. I do have an additional question though, which is what you think about how to to evaluate moments that have a combination of good and bad.
For instance, let's suppose you have the best day ever, except that you had a mild pain in your leg for the most of the day. All the awesome stuff you did during the day more than made up for that mild pain though.
Now let's suppose you are offered the prospect of having a copy of you repeat that day exactly. We both agree that doing this would add no additional value, the question i...
Suppose I have choice between the following:
A) One simulation of me is run for me 100 years, before being deleted.
B) Two identical simulations of me are run for 100 years, before being deleted.
Is the second choice preferable to the first? Should I be willing to pay more to have multiple copies of me simulated, even if those copies will have the exact same experiences?
Forgive me if this question has been answered before. I have Googled to no avail.