timtyler comments on Open Problems Related to the Singularity (draft 1) - Less Wrong

39 Post author: lukeprog 13 December 2011 10:57AM

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Comment author: Matt_Simpson 14 December 2011 02:57:50AM 0 points [-]

How would an ideal agent with infinite computing power choose an ideal prior? (A guess: we'd need an anthropic, non-Cartesian, higher-order-logic version of Solomonoff induction.) How can this be process be approximated computably and tractably?

A question for those who know such things. What's the issue with Solomonoff induction here? Is it that the Solomonoff prior doesn't take into account certain prior information that we do have, but isn't based on simply updating from the original (Solomonoff) prior?

Comment author: timtyler 14 December 2011 05:27:27PM *  0 points [-]

What's the issue with Solomonoff induction here?

"Higher-order-logic": reputedly down to concerns about uncomputability - which don't seem very interesting to me.

"Anthropic: I figure that can be dealt with in the same way as any other reference machine problem: by "conditioning" it by exposing it to the world.

"Cartesian": I think that's probably to do with this (from E.Y.):

AIXI devises a Cartesian model of a separated environmental theatre, rather than devising a model of a naturalistic reality that includes AIXI.

Fun stuff - but nothing specifically to do with Solomonoff induction. The papers on Orseau's Mortal Universal Agents page address this issue.