When did I say that color was a near-universal attribute?

Here's what indicated as much:

There really are attributes for colors that are near-universal, for humans.

An "attribute for color" is not much different from showing that a name is an attribute for a color. Again, you were making the same mistake by thinking that a name for a color is an absolute. Definitely not the case, which you recognize:

You are right though--for that claim to make sense colors also have to be assumed to be near-universal.

To continue –

However, notice how color blindness and tetrachromacy are considered exceptions to the norm. These exceptions are largely the reason I specified near-universal for humans rather than simply universal for humans.

– I further pointed out that humans do not live in a mono-culture with a universal language that predetermines the arrangement of linguistic space in connection to perceived colors. That is the norm, such that the claim of near-universality does not apply. (And were such a mono-culture present, all it would take is a small deviation to accumulate to undermine it. Think of the Tower of Babel.)

The objection I posited covers all cases, even the exceptions. It's really the mind-projection fallacy, such that one human regards their "normal" experience as the "normal" experience of "normal" humans, more or less.