Value is something that can only exist in minds, and if everyone were to suddenly change their minds about that which is valuable, all the labor in the world used to produce a previously desired product wouldn't mean a thing.
This is mostly an argument about definitions. If everyone's minds were modified so that people would start valuing the eating of babies, there is still a clear sense in which it won't become a right thing. If you are talking about that which most people value at any given time, then certainly it depends on what most people value at that time, and people's minds are part of your definition that controls its meaning. If instead you form a fixed designator for whatever people currently value, it will still be pointing to the same thing if people in the future start valuing different things, and minds of future people won't be involved in this definition and won't control its meaning.
I suspect that achieving a clear mental picture of the sheer depth and breadth of the mind projection fallacy is a powerful mental tool. It's hard for me to state this in clearer terms, though, because I don't have a wide collection of good examples of the mind projection fallacy.
In a discussion yesterday, we all had trouble finding actual example of the mind projection fallacy. Overall, we had essentially two examples:
Searching for "mind projection fallacy" on Less Wrong, I also see:
- Thinking that purpose is an inherent property of something, instead of it having been placed there by someone for some reason. (here)
- Mulling or arguing over definitions to solve object-level problems. (actually, most the ways words can be wrong sequence)
Imagine I'm trying to explain the mind projection fallacy to someone, and giving a handful of sharp, clear examples before explaining the general principle. What are some examples I could use? (I really want to explain it more sharply to myself, but also to members of my meetup.)