pragmatist comments on A case study in fooling oneself - Less Wrong

-2 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 15 December 2011 05:25AM

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Comment author: pragmatist 16 December 2011 12:41:25AM *  1 point [-]

My best understanding of the MWI's take on the Born rule is that the ratio of the number of branches for each outcome to the total number of branches gives you the probability of each outcome.

This is not the way the Oxford Everettians understand the Born rule. See the Hilary Greaves paper I linked to for a discussion of their decision-theoretic approach to probabilities in the MWI. This approach has its problems, but they are problems that the Everettians acknowledge and attempt to address (not entirely successfully, in my opinion). That's very different from Mark's attitude.

Also, the Orzel post you linked to doesn't seem to support your contention. Where do you see him committing himself to the branch counting appproach you propose? (EDIT: Actually, I see that there is discussion of the issue in the comments to that post, which is probably what you meant.)

Comment author: shminux 16 December 2011 01:39:42AM 2 points [-]

From the paper:

Deutsch claimed to 'prove', via decision theory, that the 'rational' agent who believes she lives in an Everettian multiverse will nevertheless 'make decisions as if' the mod-squared measure gave chances for outcomes.

This must a bad wording, or something, otherwise why does a "rational" agent who does not believe "she lives in an Everettian multiverse" can still confirm the Born rule experimentally time after time?

Comment author: Luke_A_Somers 19 April 2012 05:20:43PM 0 points [-]

The proof does not address rational agents who do not believe they are in an Everettian multiverse. They would have other reasons for using the Born rule.