pragmatist comments on A case study in fooling oneself - Less Wrong
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This is not the way the Oxford Everettians understand the Born rule. See the Hilary Greaves paper I linked to for a discussion of their decision-theoretic approach to probabilities in the MWI. This approach has its problems, but they are problems that the Everettians acknowledge and attempt to address (not entirely successfully, in my opinion). That's very different from Mark's attitude.
Also, the Orzel post you linked to doesn't seem to support your contention. Where do you see him committing himself to the branch counting appproach you propose? (EDIT: Actually, I see that there is discussion of the issue in the comments to that post, which is probably what you meant.)
From the paper:
This must a bad wording, or something, otherwise why does a "rational" agent who does not believe "she lives in an Everettian multiverse" can still confirm the Born rule experimentally time after time?
The proof does not address rational agents who do not believe they are in an Everettian multiverse. They would have other reasons for using the Born rule.