I had thought of Einstein's Arrogance as being about the enormous amount of unstated and perhaps unconscious bayesian evidence Einstein had that his model was correct. I'm not making the inductive step from there to "just forget about winning the lottery."
edit: I just realized the reading that makes sense: If you calculate the probability of a certain event, and the number is unbelievably small, you probably made a mistake in your calculations; or your intuition wouldn't have brought up the event in the first place.
I think there's plenty of room for both to be correct: Your intuition is evidence, but if you make an explicit probability calculation and it contradicts your intuition, be aware that due to a number of biases, you're still likely to overweight the probability.
Today's post, But There's Still A Chance, Right? was originally published on 06 January 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was A Failed Just-So Story, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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