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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Problems of the Deutsch-Wallace version of Many Worlds - Less Wrong
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Someone asked me to join the discussion, so here goes:
I don't buy the decision-theory thing. I don't think I can make a quantum coinflip come out a different way by redefining my utility function. So no, this ain't my MWI.
The Oxford Everettians don't think so either. I mean, come on, Deutsch and Wallace are pretty smart people. Let's give them a little bit of credit. If your construal of their view is just blatantly absurd, the problem is probably with your construal, not their view. I tried to give some sense of Wallace's position in these comments.
The point of Wallace's argument is that no matter what your preference ordering over rewards (assuming they obey certain intuitive constraints), you will recover the Born probabilities.
I have read your sequence on QM and MWI and you seem to support this very view of MWI, just not this derivation of Born Rule, but if you really believe in the splitting-MWI, how do you avoid this problem?