I know my own values because they're what I try to maximize. All that's apparent to me is my qualia, and, while I concede that other people have qualia, I see no importance in anything that isn't someone's qualia.
I'm not disputing your line of thought, but I still wonder about something I touched upon before, if neuroscience or the likes would dissolve qualia into smaller components, and it would become apparent to you that "There is no unitary thing as qualia/mind frame, the momentary experience is reducible, but an anthill, a screen with pixels". Would that exhort you to reassess your utopia?
I see no reason that the reducibility of something would deny it's potential status as something to be valued. I could value whirlpools without denying that they're made of water, or (for an example closer to reality) literature without denying that it's made up of words which are made up of letters.
Singularitarians frequently lament the irrevocably dead and the lack of widespread application of cryonics. Many cryonocists feel that as many lives as possible should be (and in a more rational world, would be) cryopreserved. Eliezer Yudkowsky, in an update to the touching note on the death of his younger brother Yehuda, forcefully expressed this sentiment:
Ignoring the debate concerning the merits of cryopreservation itself and the feasibility of mass cryonics, I would like to question the assumption that every life is worth preserving for posterity.
Consider those who have demonstrated through their actions that they are best kept excluded from society at large. John Wayne Gacy and Jeffrey Dahmer would be prime examples. Many people write these villains off as evil and give their condition not a second thought. But it is quite possible that they actually suffer from some sort of mental illness and are thus not fully responsible for their crimes. In fact, there is evidence that the brains of serial killers are measurably different from those of normal people. Far enough in the future, it might be possible to "cure" them. However, they will still possess toxic memories and thoughts that would greatly distress them now that they are normal. To truly repair them, they would likely need to have many or all of their memories erased. At that point, with an amnesic brain and a cloned body, are they even really the same person, and if not, what was the point of cryopreserving them?
Forming a robust theory of mind and realizing that not everyone thinks or sees the world the same way you do is actually quite difficult. Consider the immense complexity of the world we live in and the staggering scope of thoughts that can possibly be thought as a result. If cryopreservation means first and foremost mind preservation, maybe there are some minds that just shouldn't be preserved. Maybe the future would be a better, happier place without certain thoughts, feelings and memories--and without the minds that harbor them.
Personally, I think the assumption of "better safe than sorry" is a good-enough justification for mass cryonics (or for cryonics generally), but I think that assumption, like any, should at least be questioned.