You don't interpret "utility" the same way others here do, just like the word "happiness". Our utility inherently includes terms for things like inequity. What you are using the word "utility" here for would be better described as "happiness".

We had the happiness discussion already. I'm using the same utility-happiness distinction now as then.

(You're doing that "speaking for everyone" thing again. Also, what you would call "speaking for me", and misinterpreting me. But that's okay. I expect that to happen in conversations.)

<EDITED TO USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY>

Our utility inherently includes terms for things like inequity.

The little-u u(situation) can include terms for inequity. The big-U U(lottery of situations) can't, if you're an expected utility maximizer. You are constrained to aggregate over different outcomes by averaging.

Since the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem indicates that averaging is necessary in order to avoid violating their reasonable-seeming axioms of utility, my question is then whether it is inconsistent to use expected utility over possible outcomes, and NOT use expected utility across people.

Since you do both, that's perfectly consistent. The question is whether anything else makes sense in light of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem. </EDIT>

<part below left as is because someone responded to it> If you maximize expected utility, that means that an action that results in utility 101 for one future you in one possible world, and utility 0 for 9 future yous in 9 equally-likely possible worlds; is preferable to an action that results in utility 10 for all 10 future yous. That is very similar to saying that you would rather give utilty 101 to 1 person and utility 0 to 9 other people, than utility 10 to 10 people.