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Eugine_Nier comments on Should we discount extraordinary implications? - Less Wrong
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This sounds like a general argument in favor of acting on my intuitions rather than implementing theory. For example, if I intuit that turning left at this intersection will get me where I want to go, it seems that this argument suggests that I should turn left at this intersection rather than looking at a map.
Am I misunderstanding you?
Come to think of it, I don't actually see how that follows from what I said. I said that intuitions can change as a result of consciously held theories, not that this is necessarily bad, depending on the theory (although it would be nice to keep an copy of an old intuition on ROM and do periodic sanity checks).
Sure.
But if you start with intuition I1 and theory T at time T1, and subsequently end up with intuition I2 at time T2, what you seem to be endorsing is following I1 at T1 and I2 at T2. At no time are you endorsing following T if T conflicts with I at that time.
Which is what I meant by acting on my intuitions rather than implementing theory.
I'm at a complete loss for what a "sanity check" might look like. That is, OK, I have I2 in my brain, and I1 backed up on ROM, and I can compare them, and they make different judgments. Now what?
If I1 finds the judgement returned by I2 completely absurd even after looking at the argument, recognize that I should be confused and act accordingly.