Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on The Human's Hidden Utility Function (Maybe) - Less Wrong

44 Post author: lukeprog 23 January 2012 07:39PM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 January 2012 10:32:28PM 13 points [-]

Um, objection, I didn't actually say that and I would count the difference as pretty significant here. I said, "I would be suspicious of that for the inverse reason my brain wants to say 'but there has to be a different way to stop the train' in the trolley problem - it sounds like the correct answer ought to be to just keep the part with the coherent utility function in CEV which would make it way easier, but then someone's going to jump up and say: 'Ha ha! Love and friendship were actually in the other two!'"

Comment author: lukeprog 23 January 2012 10:42:52PM *  6 points [-]

What? You said that? Sorry, I didn't mean to misquote you so badly. I'll blame party distractions or something. Do you remember the line about a gift basket and it possibly making CEV easier?

Anyway, I'll edit the OP immediately to remove the misquote.

For reference, the original opening to this post was:

Me: "Suppose it turned out that humans violate the axioms of VNM rationality (and therefore don't act like they have utility functions) because there are three valuation systems in the brain that make conflicting valuations, and all three systems contribute to choice. And suppose that upon reflection we would clearly reject the outputs of two of these systems, whereas the third system looks something more like a utility function. How would you feel?"

Eliezer: "I would feel like someone had left an enormous gift basket at my front door. That could make CEV easier."

Me: "Okay, well, what I just described is part of the leading theory of choice in the human brain."