1. This is not a rational defection, so punishment is only partially useful.

Suppose the man also has an "irrational" preference that his daughter not be punished.

1. Punishing someone else is not as strong a disincentive as punishing the perp. Family bonds are usually weaker than self preservation, and in many cases, totally absent.

In my example the man commited suicide so he obviously didn't value his own like as much as his daughter's.

If you modified it to see if the family bonds were strong before punishing someone else, that would create an incentive to not associate with family.

There have existed societies where family members were punished for crimes, what you are describing didn't happen in those societies.

1. This policy puts a load on the family that is present even if no crime is ever committed. Putting this load on everybody for the sake of a decrease in an already small crime rate probably isn't worth it.

I'm not quite sure what you mean by this.

In any case two comments on the style of your reply.

1. You seem to be trying to argue that this scenario isn't plausible, I find it much more plausible then your two-month rehab scenario, or for that matter any type of reliable rehab.

2. You seem to be displaying the symptoms of trying to defend a fake utility function, i.e., trying to argue why your stated preferences won't force you to do things you find morally repugnant, rather than trying to find preferences that match your intuitions of what's morally repugnant.