[LINK] "The nirvana would be if the questions raised by Oprah Winfrey would be answered by the faculty at Harvard."
I once very politely raised the thought that one reason philosophy departments have been cut is the fault of philosophers. The answer always comes back: 'The point of philosophy is to ask questions, not to give answers.' I can't help but think 'No. It can't be!' Imagine if you applied that question to other areas – is the purpose of rocket science to ask questions about rockets?
Loading…
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Comments (11)
I would be very surprised if "the point of philosophy is to ask questions, not to give answers.' was part of the 'don't de-fund us' pitch from the philosophy departments at more than a handful of universities.
It's a nice quote, and correct as far as it goes. "We raise these questions not in order to provide definitive answers, but in order to stimulate questioning" is an annoying trope. However, a few thoughts:
This is why our kind can't cooperate. You're denouncing as an "idiot" a man whom, if we were to somehow successfully elicit both of your value systems, you would probably agree with 98%.
When SIAI's rationality curriculum is finished and disseminated, it's possible Alain de Botton will get ahold of it. He will probably think, "Yeah, this is what I'm talking about. It's a bit jargon-y; they could take that down a few notches. But the message is there: directions for dealing with life that aren't equivalent to a rabbit's foot. Cool!"
Ok, it's undoubtedly true that de Botton and I share a good many values. But I do insist that his current project strikes me as incredibly misguided if not outright stupid. I would expect him to be quite resistant to an SIAI-like program of answers to the kinds of "philosophical" questions he's asking. He seems to believe that religious leaders, despite basing their teachings on their totally groundless factual claims about reality, are important moral teachers who must be taken with utmost seriousness. And he believes that (for example) Richard Dawkins, in advocating for factual positions that de Botton believes are correct, is being destructive. It's simply no better than a theory of non-overlapping magisteria.
Also, as I said before, I think he's wrong that research into the questions he's interested in is not being done. For a man who abandoned academia (he began a PhD in French philosophy, a field of interest which is very unlikely to be a good sign) in favor of being a popular writer, he doesn't seem very interested in seeking out that research and popularizing it. Instead he says things like (from the original link): "The arrogance that says analysing the relationship between reasons and causes is more important than writing a philosophy of shyness or sadness or friendship drives me nuts. I can't accept that." I'm not sure exactly what analysis of "the relationship between reasons and causes" he's referring to, but he clearly states that all research into metaphysics is pointless, while "philosophy of" various aspects of everyday life is of vital importance.
I see no sign that he'd find LW-style thinking congenial or constructive, or that he in fact values knowledge as such. I think he values lofty rhetoric and vague-but-profound-sounding statements about ordinary life. I deny that he plays for my team.
I don't think this sounds "incredibly misguided." It just sounds like a neat building where a woefully tiny minority of people with certain traits -- high intelligence, social conscientiousness, maybe a credulous streak or an awe addiction, probably religious parents and community -- might have a deconversion experience. If he thinks droves of people are going to spontaneously switch brand loyalties, then yes, he's misguided. But the building is still neat.
Also, I bet the woefully tiny minority mentioned above overlap quite a bit with doubt-fraught religious folks whose brand loyalty is bolstered by Dawkins' occasionally shitty attitude. Again, a niche market at best.
As for your second paragraph, yeah, you're probably right. My interest in de Botton derives from my stubborn belief that stuff like the Sequences can survive compression into one-sentence maxims. He occasionally nails this on his Twitter feed. He could be better at it, sure, but I think getting this type of compression algorithm right is what gets ideas into people's heads.
I don't know what it takes to get picked for your team, so I don't know if you have enough information to support that denial. But I do hope you're wrong.
Alain de Botton is quite possibly correct that "religious institutions and rituals" supporting an ethical system could exist without involving any theistic cosmology or similar doctrines. Confucian 'religion' is a case in point. Yes, Confucianism evolved from Chinese ancient religion, but it developed independently over many centuries as a non-theistic system. The same process could occur with modern Western morality, which historically evolved from Protestant millennialist Christianity.
So, sort of familiar, but not backed up by the same specifics, or even intent. Also, more passive aggressiveness.
That quote is kind of awesomely terrible. Sure, as everyone knows, all fields of human endeavor have exactly the same kind of purpose!
If it is a good idea to hold off on proposing solutions, then why isn't it okay to have a division of labour between those that merely discuss a problem as thoroughly as possible (in this case, some philosophers) and those that settle on a final solution (in this case, some scientists and engineers)?
Note: I believe that philosophy has solved some problems and that these solutions are usually the fundamental principles of an immature science (at which point they stop considering such problems as being within the domain of philosophy).
Daniel Dennett
The question is not about philosophy but institutionalized philosophy.
a) Would those immature sciences not have been born if not for institutionalized philosophy? b) Do you expect new sciences to be born within the philosophy departments we have today?
Or do you expect rather that a new science is more likely to arise as a result of Big Questions being asked in the mundane disciplines of our empirical sciences?