Sure - egoists, assign some value to avoiding the end of the world.
For them, it isn't billions of times worse than all their friends and relatives dying, though.
Smaller utilities mean that the "tiny chance times huge utility" sums don't have the same results as for utilitarians.
This results in disagreements over policy issues. For instance, an egoist might regard a utilitarian organisation - like the Singularity Institute - gaining power as being a bad thing - since they plainly have such a different set of values. They would be willing to gamble small chances of a huge utility - while the egoist might regard the huge utility as being illusory.
This is a problem because (I claim) the actions of most people more closely approximate those of egoists than utilitarians - since they were built by natural selection to value their own inclusive fitness.
The Singularity Institute is a kind of utilitarian club - where utilitarians club together in an attempt to steal the future, against practically everyone else's wishes.
Smaller utilities mean that the "tiny chance times huge utility" sums don't have the same results as for utilitarians.
Beware Pascal's wager. Also worthy of note is that Eliezer himself doesn't gamble on a small probability. But maybe you talked about the difference the egoist could make? Then I agree it amounts to a much smaller probability.
On the other hand, I think the prospect of living a few aeons represents by itself a huge utility, even for an egoist. It might still be worth a long shot.
Many people on Less Wrong believe reducing existential risk is one of the most important causes. Most arguments to this effect point out the horrible consequences: everyone now living would die (or face something even worse). The situation becomes even worse if we also consider future generations. Such an argument, as spelt out in Nick Bostrom's latest paper on the topic, for instance, should strike many consequentialists as persuading. But of course, not everyone's a consequentialist, and on other approaches it's far from obvious that existential risk should come out on top. Might it be worth to spend some more time investigating arguments for existential risk reduction that don't presuppose consequentialism? Of course, "non-consequentialism" is a very diverse category, and I'd be surprised if there were a single argument that covered all its members.