I'm still waiting for a method for interpersonal utility comparison.
I suspect you already have one. In dealing with others, I think most people use interpersonal utility comparisons all the time as a factor in their own decision making.
So, to be clear, I think you have one as well, and are really just waiting for those who have another interpersonal utility weighting, which they claim is "true", to rationally support their supposed truth. I've been waiting for that one. Harassed a number of people over at Sam Harris's web site asking about it.
Until then, I'll stick with non-cognitivism and leave utilitarianism to the metaphysicians.
I don't think non-cognitivism is the whole story on morality. People make moral distinctions, and some part of that is cognitively mediated, even when not verbally mediated. One cognitively recognizes a pattern one has a non-cognitive response to.
I suspect you already have one. In dealing with others, I think most people use interpersonal utility comparisons all the time as a factor in their own decision making.
So, to be clear, I think you have one as well, and are really just waiting for those who have another interpersonal utility weighting, which they claim is "true", to rationally support their supposed truth. I've been waiting for that one. Harassed a number of people over at Sam Harris's web site asking about it.
It sounds like we are mostly in agreement, but there is an important...
Many people on Less Wrong believe reducing existential risk is one of the most important causes. Most arguments to this effect point out the horrible consequences: everyone now living would die (or face something even worse). The situation becomes even worse if we also consider future generations. Such an argument, as spelt out in Nick Bostrom's latest paper on the topic, for instance, should strike many consequentialists as persuading. But of course, not everyone's a consequentialist, and on other approaches it's far from obvious that existential risk should come out on top. Might it be worth to spend some more time investigating arguments for existential risk reduction that don't presuppose consequentialism? Of course, "non-consequentialism" is a very diverse category, and I'd be surprised if there were a single argument that covered all its members.