Rationality Quotes February 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB.
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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Comments (401)
Saeid Fard
Indeed, even this quote is way below 140 characters :-)
By the way, you're off by a year: the February 2013 thread is here.
oops
Nassim Taleb
Isn't it a common-place of forecasting (and chaos theory in particular) that short-term projections can be terribly inaccurate, even while long-term forecasting can be extremely accurate?
Chaos theory often points in the opposite direction. For example, consider weather simulations which become worse than careful ignorance after 5 days- slight variations in initial conditions (and multiplication roundoff errors in computation, and so on) grow out of control, and soon the system is less accurate than just saying "it rains 20% of the time in general; 6 days from now, there is a 20% chance of rain."
It is often the case that long-run means are easier to predict than short-run means, in large part because the variability in long-run means is lower. This is especially the case for systems with negative feedback loops, where the system corrects deviations from normality, making normality especially likely.
It's not clear to me that that does much for oil prices or social security deficits, since I don't see either as being systems where the negative feedback is obviously stronger than the positive feedback.
Typically, short-term forecasting is stymied by noise rather than fundamental underlying uncertainty. For example, consider the wager between Simon and Ehrlich. They used a basket of commodities because they didn't want short-term noise to upset the wager, but the main difference in the long-term predictions was the different underlying models.
In both the oil and Social Security examples, there are powerful long-term trends which mean we should have as much or more confidence in long-term projections than short-term ones: in oil, as a nonrenewable resource, the more efficient the market the closer it will conform to Hotelling's rule, and in SS, it's almost entirely driven by locked-in demographics or actuarial factors, and the uncertainty is in how and whether payouts will be modified or revenue increased.
(The latter might be what Taleb is getting at, but since he's an arrogant blowhard who loves to oversimplify and believes he is right about everything, I am not inclined to be charitable and think he's making a subtle claim about the different sources of variability and their foreseeability over the short and long run.)
Regardless, Taleb is making the argument: "if we cannot predict something in the short term, we cannot predict it in the long-term" which is not true of many things and may not even be true of his chosen examples.
-- Doron Zeilberger - (see also)
Possibly useful career advice, but not a rationality quote.
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow
--Albert Einstein
Mandatory for science, generally advisable for anything else.
This advice is worse than useless. But coming from someone who was instrumental in the "Physicists have figured a way to efficiently eradicate humanity; let's tell the politicians so they may facilitate!" movement, it's not surprising.
Protip: the maxim "That which can be destroyed by the truth, should be" does not mean we should publish secrets that have a chance of ending global civilization.
I tend to think of science as the public common knowledge of mankind. It is obviously not the only kind of knowledge. Also I would say that humans tend to err more often in the direction of needlessly keeping secret important information rather than in the direction sharing it too easily.
Especially since it is easier to fool yourself than others.
Nassim Taleb
Taleb runs an interesting Facebook, but if you don't want to get a Facebook account, I expect that a lot of this material will be in his upcoming book about anti-fragility (systems which get stronger when stressed).
I just realized that his domain dependence is equivalent to Rand's "concrete-bound mentality"-- in both cases, it's getting stuck on a single example rather than seeing general principles.
-- Attributed to Gregory Cochran
On intellectual hipsters.
I would be very interested if anyone has good examples of this phenomenon.
There are a few "triads" mentioned in the intellectual hipster article, but the only one that really seems to me like a good example of this phenomenon is the "don't care about Africa / give aid to Africa / don't give aid to Africa" triad.
Well, the "dumb" (and uneducated) explanation of airfoil lift is that wings push air downwards.
The slightly less dumb people get exposed to bits and pieces of products of thought of very very smart people, which they completely don't understand and absolutely can't use for reasoning. But they want to be smart. So they come up with explanation that air on top of the wing must match up with the air on the bottom, but path is longer, so it must go faster, and so with bernoulli effect, there's lift. Reduced from dumbly talking in dumbspeech to incoherently babbling in smartspeech.
The actually smart people's explanation is that wings push air downwards (and also pull it downwards).
The reasoning tools made by real smart people for real smart people are a memetic hazard to semi smart slightly educated people, but not so much to uneducated people, in much same way how power tools made for adults are a huge hazard to children that can open the cabinet, but not infants. If we meet super smart aliens, and they just dump knowledge, results on the really smart people might well be exactly the same.
Cracked, 4 Reasons Humans Will Never Understand Each Other
I had already read about the ideas of that Cracked in the sequences (http://lesswrong.com/lw/i7/belief_as_attire/, http://lesswrong.com/lw/9v/beware_of_otheroptimizing/, http://lesswrong.com/lw/i0/are_your_enemies_innately_evil/), but I still found it awesome.
A bit long for a quote. Might have been a good summary for a discussion post link.
-- Scott Aaronson, in this blog post, reaching out to the pointy-haired bosses of the quantum computing world.
A poem about decision trees:
Michael Rothkopf
"Seek truth from facts"
--Chinese saying
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seek_truth_from_facts
— Will Durant, Life, Oct. 18, 1963
George Orwell
He's mistaken about math and physics, possibly because he didn't expect his ideas on the subjects to be tested against solid reality....
--George Box
Dupe: http://lesswrong.com/lw/2ev/rationality_quotes_july_2010/285f
--Jane Espenson
That is brilliant, I'm taking that one. It's refreshing to see an alternative to the typical belligerently optimistic 'motivational' quotes that deny the rather significant influence of chance.
Well, but it can also be interpreted as a recursive definition expanding to:
Time and Robbery by Rebecca Ore
This quote hasn't gotten any karma yet-- it isn't funny, and it seems so obvious as to almost not be worth saying.
Still, I suspect that a lot of trouble is caused by ignoring that advice.
-Andrew W. Mathis
Or potentially good luck if the combination of your instincts and the (irrationally justified) memes you inherited from tradition are better than your abstract decision making.
Or maybe some non-negligible subset of superstitions give good luck because they're in fact rationally justifiable.
Is this not approximately the same thing that I said, just changed from: "It is good luck to <be a person who tends to selectively implement strategies in class X>" to "There is a class X of strategies that represent good luck" and a truncation of some causal details regarding the selection process? (That is, is my meaning not clear?)
Mere difference in connotation. I attribute my good luck to the gods, and would be annoyed at the implication that such an attribution is irrational justification obscuring my good luck's allegedly-actual origin in my optimistic outlook or whatever. By my lights some non-negligible subset of superstitions give good luck due to the combination of ones instincts, cultural inheritance, and also quite crucially the help of the gods. This is compatible with what you said but I wanted to emphasize the importance of the gods, without which I suspect many superstitions would be pointless. It's true that as you imply maybe even in the absence of gods superstitions would still be adaptive, but I'm less sure of such a counterfactual than of this world where there are in fact gods.
I'm afraid I must disagree with your connotation now that it is explicit and for the following reason:
No, the problem isn't with the whole "gods exist" idea. Rather, given that gods (counterfactually) exist, rational and justified belief in them and behaving in a way that reflects that belief is not superstition. It's the same as acting as though quarks exist. When those crackpots who don't believe in gods (despite appearing to be on average for more epistemically rational in all other areas and appearing to have overwhelming evidence with respect to this one) call you superstitious for behaving as an agent who exists in the actual world they are mistaken.
This is a dispute over definitions then? On your terms then what should I call the various cognitive habits I have about not jinxing things and so on? (I don't think the analogy to quarks holds, because quarks aren't mysterious agenty things in my environment, they're just some weird detail of some weird model of physics, whereas gods are very phenomenologically present.) It seems there is a distinct set of behaviors that people call "superstition" and that should be called "superstition" even if they are the result of epistemically rational beliefs. The set of behaviors is largely characterized by its presumption of mysterious supernatural agency. I see no reason not to call various of my cognitive habits superstitions, as it'd be harder to characterize them if I couldn't use that word. This despite thinking my superstitions have strong epistemic justification.
That, and how the abstract concepts represented by them interact with the insight underlying the quote. Oh, and underneath that and causing the disagreement is a fundamental incompatibility of view of the nature of the universe itself which is in turn caused by, from what you have said in the past, a dispute over how the very act of epistemological thinking should be done.
What's the nature of the difference? I figure we both have some sort of UDT-inspired framework for epistemology, bolstered in certain special cases by intuitions about algorithmic probability, and so any theoretical disagreements we have could presumably be resolved by recourse to such higher level principles. On the practical end of course we're likely to have somewhat varying views simply due to differing cognitive styles and personal histories, and we've likely reached very different conclusions on various particular subjects for various reasons. Is our dispute more on the theoretical or pragmatic side?
I can only make inferences based on what you have described of yourself (for example 'post-rationalist' type descriptions) as well, obviously, as updates based on conclusions that have been reached. Given that the subject is personal I should say explicitly that nothing in this comment is intended to be insulting - I speak only as a matter of interest.
I think UDT dominates your epistemology more than it does mine. Roughly speaking UDT considerations don't form the framework of my epistemology but instead determine what part of the epistemology to use when decision making. This (probably among other things that I am not aware of) leads me to make less drastic conclusions about fundamental moralities and gods. Yet UDT considerations remain significant when deciding which things to bother even considering as probabilities in such a way that the diff of will/wedrifid's epistemology kernel almost certainly remains far smaller than wedrifid/average_philosopher.
Yes, most of our thinking is just a bunch of messy human crap that could be ironed out by such recourse.
A little of both I think? At least when I interpret that at the level of "theories about theorizing" and "pragmatic theorizing". Not much at all (from what I can see) with respect to actually being pragmatic.
But who knows? Modelling other humans internal models is hard enough even when you are modelling cookie cutter 'normal' ones.
Or because their signalling (or countersignalling) value outweighs their instrumental disadvantages.
Or, while we are at it, superstitions held by those with a generally optimistic outlook will tend towards 'good luck' superstitions and so result in greater exploitation of potential opportunities.
-Bertrand Russell
-William M. Briggs
Voted up for the link, but the meaning of the quote isn't very clear out of context.
--Joyce Cary
Relevant.
-- Ronald E. Merrill
(The brackets around "vertebrates" are just for a spelling correction.)
This sounds radical but is if anything far too conservative.
Intelligence and tool using has for millennia allowed us to apply selection pressures which are much more focused than natural selection, and now also allows us to directly edit genetic material in ways which would be slower or even impossible via random mutation alone. Intelligence also allows for the generation, mutation, and replication of ideas, which end up having a much greater, much more rapidly changing impact on ourselves and our environment than the variation in our genes alone.
Those aren't changes comparable to the difference between breathing water and breathing air; they're changes comparable to the difference between non-life and life. The very idea of biological clades becomes more and more fuzzy when we make horizontal gene transfer a regular fact of life for even complex organisms, intermixing DNA from species that haven't had a common ancestor in a billion years.
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War
quoted from here in that particular form
Reddit user sciencecomic, in response to a headline reading "'Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not'. Emory philosopher Robert McCauley suggests that science is more fragile than we think while religion more resilient – all for reasons coming back to humans' cognitive processes."
You should include a link.
Done.
--Bertrand Russell, pg 178 Last philosophical testament: 1943-68
There is one art, no more, no less: to do all things with artlessness.
-Piet Hein
Why is "artlessness" desirable? AIUI the word means "without skill".
"Artlessness" has a connotation of doing something naturally/smoothly/without guile.
Wiktionary gives both senses for artless. These words change sense over time, too. For instance, it's my impression that once upon a time, saying that a person's work was "artificial" was a compliment, meaning that it showed great skill (artifice). Today it would imply that it was inauthentic, contrived, or a surface imitation.
Less is more.
Ockham's razor (the law of parsimony, economy or succinctness), is a principle that generally recommends that, from among competing hypotheses, selecting the one that makes the fewest new assumptions usually provides the correct one, and that the simplest explanation will be the most plausible until evidence is presented to prove it false.
I suspect that in this context it's meant to connote "attending to the task, rather than attending to your own technique for performing the task."
Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room, (Control and Self-Control)
-- Richard Carrier
--Burning Man organizers
From the blog post:
It seems pretty easy to solve: auction off all the tickets.
The Market Economics Fairy is pleased with you! She blesses you with sparkles from her wand!
What profit does she get from dispensing sparkles?
It improves the chance that further Market Economics will happen by rewarding people who produce it. It goes without saying that Market Economics is a terminal value to the Market Economics Fairy. If she was just interested in profit, she'd be starting a hedge fund instead of going around telling people about Market Economics.
Market Economics fairy should consider starting a hedge fund anyway and investing that money into a lobby group or other means of promoting Market Economics. I sincerely doubt emitting sparkles from her wand is where her comparative advantage lies.
What do you mean? The Market Economics Fairy is way better at emitting sparkles from her wand than anyone else, and has no special talent for managing hedge funds.
Just how much better than everyone else is she? Perhaps her comparative advantage is in creating a power company. Spend early revenue on recursively improving (ie. research that is money limited) sparkle -> electricity conversion then spend later revenue on hiring people to do FAI<Market Economics Fairy> research so she can maintain and consolidate her overall advantage as technology makes sparkle power obsolete.
Unfortunately for the rest of us the FAI<MEF> creates an environment that degenerates into a Hansonian Hell (then further into mere cosmic commons burning). If it behaved like a FAI<humanity> and did the smart thing and became a singleton the market economics fairy would disintegrate into a puff of vapor - presumably not part of her extrapolated volition. Once someone has won (secured control via overwhelming intelligence advantage) 'Market Economics' becomes nothing more than a charade. Yet maintaining an environment where market economics hold sway ensures a steady evolution towards more efficient competition which will tend toward one of two obvious local minima (burn the earth or, more likely, burn the light cone, depending on whether the leap to interstellar is viable for anyone at any point in the economic competition.)
The Market Economics Fairy must (eventually) die or we will!
(Pardon the Newsomlike tangential stream. It seems relevant/interesting/important to me at least!)
Maybe, but I'm pretty sure there are substitutes: both for the role of sparkles, and manual production of them using a wand.
Well now you've proved that the Market Economics Fairy should quit her job and found a startup aimed at roboticizing sparkle production. I hope you're happy.
Very. :D
Who do you think is behind Ayn Rand?
You're missing the unstated corollary to this, or any other discussion of scalpers: 'and prices have to be "reasonable" for whatever demographic we claim to serve or would prefer to serve'.
Hence, you get discussions of young girl singers unhappy that all these icky old men are paying hundreds of dollars for the tickets to her concert, even though the market doesn't clear at the $40 or $60 her preteen fans can spare. (And if an organization does let the price float to its natural level of hundreds of dollars, then you get shocked articles in the newspaper on 'ticket inflation' and angry letters to the editor about how in their day you could get in for a nickel...)
Would public hostility really result in lower profits than just selling at the market equilibrium price? If I did not know about the actual amount of scalping that happen, I would be very suprised to learn that tickets are priced so far below equilibrium.
Hostility might not be the only risk. If you want to have fans for an extended period, you'd do well to attract young people-- and they're likely to not have as much money.
The public hostility is clearly a negative of some kind; whether it actually reduces net lifetime discounted income or some metric like that, you'd have to ask an economist.
But the artists clearly do want to avoid the true prices being in any way ascribable to them. An example: I read in an article somewhere of the lawsuits against Ticketmaster where apparently one of the revelations was that high powered acts were able to quietly demand shares of Ticketmaster's 'fees' - this price increase was not perceived as a price increase by the act, but as Ticketmaster's fault. They took the blame in exchange for the act using their services, basically. I would guess that Ticketmaster gets a bigger percentage of the 'fees' than they would get in a straight ticket price increase; this difference would represent Ticketmaster's compensation for taking the heat. (And there was another bit, about acts demanding larger fractions of the tickets, which they would quietly sell at premium prices - but without the public opprobrium accompanying official prices that high.)
This post seems relevant.
I agree that ticketing is a difficult problem, but getting rid of scalping is easy if that's your primary objective. Pricing the externalities of event-goers is tough, especially when anti-discrimination legislation means you generally can't be upfront about it.
So there is the problem: The ideal of non-discrimination is not compatible with cases where the demographics of event-goers is itself a strong influence on the quality of the event for everyone involved.
I don't get the impression that getting rid of scalping is easy at all. What do you have in mind?
In the ancestral post, I recommend auctioning off the tickets. This ensures that the people who are willing to pay the most get the tickets, dramatically reducing the demand and increasing the risk for scalpers (if I buy a $20 ticket to a show I expect to sell out, a price decline is unlikely, and even if it happens it's probably only a few bucks per ticket. If I buy a $500 ticket to a show I expect to sell out, a price decline could wipe me out).
Now, you could still have people buying tickets at auction to sell at the door to people who weren't prepared, but that won't be a moral issue since you've already established that the tickets go to the highest bidder.
gwern rightly points out that this doesn't always deliver the best experience. The good first approaches to diversity are quotas and subsidies. They might offer burning man attendance at historical prices to people who have come previously, and then auction off a batch of tickets to new attendees, or give previous attendees vouchers which increase their bids by a set amount or a multiplier. (Content providers could even be paid for their trouble.) Whatever you decide you want to encourage, though, you're better off working with the price system than against the price system.
Latest news: Burning Man blames game theory for their failure to understand basic supply and demand, hugely underprices tickets, 2/3 of buyers left in cold, Market Economics Fairy cries.
That's not a fair assessment of the organizers' skill level.
They seem to have a nice firm grip on the effect of fixed supply, fixed price, and increasing demand:
What they didn't predict was that the expectation of scarcity would further increase demand, creating a positive feedback loop. In their words:
So, they understand supply and demand (they just made a bad factual estimate of demand), and they didn't really understand game theory - but after they made their mistake they publicly admitted it, asked around to see what they did wrong, and proposed strategies for mitigating the mistake.
Why are we mocking them again?
I gather they didn't know how huge the demand would be this year.
Burning Man's problem might be a good topic for LW to kick around. Suppose you have pretty good abundance, how do you ration access to excellent social venues without having barriers that do damage to the venues? Is this even possible?
In this particular case, not all attendees appear to be equally valuable to the event/other attendees. Giving priority to people who've organized cool things in the last few years may make sense.
Yes, this was my reaction - 'let the price float, and give transferrable vouchers to the people who do the most awesome stuff; if they object, well, that's why the vouchers are transferrable'. It's not much different from what they're already suggesting, telling the lucky ones to distribute excess tickets among people they like.
I don't understand, won't pricing the tickets higher just cause people to be disappointed that the tickets were too expensive for them, instead of there not being enough?
It'd probably lead to a roughly equal amount of personal disappointment once the dust settles, but less disruption to the community. Major projects, the kind that the newsletter's alluding to when it talks about collaborations, aren't cheap; members of the camps that put them on usually spend at least their ticket price on supplies, to say nothing of labor. That implies that there's enough loose money floating around those projects that an increase in ticket prices wouldn't be an insurmountable hurdle.
Of course, it may very well be such a hurdle for those burners who've joined the event as spectators; principle of inclusion aside, though, those participants aren't as valuable to the organization or to each other as more committed folks. If there's concern over raising the bar too high for marginal theme camps to participate, the organizers could divert some of the excess funds into grants or reduced-price tickets for that demographic.
I get the impression that this line of thinking looks too cold-blooded for the Burning Man organizers to take to heart, though. Hence the rather strained attempt at casting the problem in terms of "Civic Responsibility" and "Communal Effort".
It will allow people that were willing to pay the market price actually buy the tickets. If there is sufficient demand then maybe a Burning Man 2 festival makes economic sense, or increasing the supply of tickets for Burning Man itself.
We live in a world of limited resources not of good wishes. Good wishes lead to dead weight losses. I don't see a possible scenario where price control is a good idea - LAW of supply and demand.
If there is some societal interest that the market fails to protect here (is Burning Man a fundamental right applicable to a certain type of person?) If so, then we should have a BMPA (like the EPA) formed to regulate the event.
Intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market are corollaries. - Ayn Rand
Welcome to Less Wrong! If you have time, feel free to introduce yourself to the community here.
Julius Evola, Occult War, on how to avoid "magic therefore Seventh Day Adventism" kinda errors when interpreting the paranormal.
--Ben O'Neill, here
Considering the above quote can be used to criticize nearly any popular political position I don't think it is inherently mind-killing. Also since we all agree democracy is a good thing this isn't even very political. The original article and context obviously does make it somewhat political.
Do we agree on that? I think there are quite a few on LessWrong who are no more in favour of democracy than Ben O'Neill. Or by linking "democracy" to the Sequences post on applause lights, do you mean to imply you mean the opposite of that sentence? Yet it is embedded between two others apparently intended straightforwardly.
That democracy can reliably be used as an applause light is a sign that we as a society agree it is indeed a good thing.
Even if society-at-large agrees something is good, the LW community may disagree in whole or in part.
Other things society-at-large treats as good and applause lights include:
Or, if I model human behavior correctly, it could also have been as sign that we as a society at one point agreed that it is a good thing but now agree that we agree that it is a reliable applause light. (But I don't think democracy-approval has devolved to that level yet. We actually do seem to think it is a good idea.)
From the mission statement of the school at which I studied political science:
But not a sign that it is indeed a good thing.
I don't think everyone here would agree that democracy is a good thing.
Obviously you are right on that. I should have said:
What I really meant by this is that Democracy is something very well entrenched and accepted in Western society and even LessWrong. Dissent from democracy isn't threatening heresy it is the mark of an eccentric.
Paul Graham has written quite extensively of why some things are considered "threatening heresy", and other things mere eccentricity. Ultimately, he concludes that in order for something to be tabooed, it must be threatening to some group that is powerful enough to enforce the taboo, but not powerful enough that the can safely ignore what their critics say about them. Democracy is currently so entrenched in western civilization that it doesn't have to give a fuck if a few people here and there criticize it occasionally.
The same is true of people who call for a dictatorship or any non-democratic form of government. They also always imagine it will be governed by "the right people", and imagine all the things "the right people" could accomplish if freed from the need to listen to the "ignorant mob".
Yes I fully agree. But it shouldn't be underestimated that when it comes to non-democratic forms of government what kind of people are in power genuinely does have a big impact on how the country is run.
Wanting a philosopher king isn't a bad idea if you aren't mistaken about the philosopher king in question.
What kind of people are in power has a big impact under all forms of government, democracy included.
Or about your definition of "Philosopher king" in the first place. The character of Marcus Aurelius fit the preferences of those in Rome who dreamt of such a philosopher king; yet he was a poor ruler who displayed apathy - including going against his moral intuitions so as not to actually do anything, like finding gladiatorial games distasteful but making no attempt to limit them - and mediocre crisis management
H. Jackson Brown
(The second-last paragraph of The Power of Agency by Lukeprog reminded me of it.)
I wonder to what extent people who become famous have a way fairly early in their careers to have other people do the routine work for them.
Rationality promotion:
-- Nate Silver, today's 538 blog
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/g-o-p-race-has-hallmarks-of-prolonged-battle/
The original even linked to the wikipedia entry on "Bayesian".
--Thomas Sowell
(On a related theme:) Intelligent folk may be better at processing evidence and drawing correct conclusions, but this is to some extent counteracted by the massive selection effects on what evidence they actually encounter.
Other than various social effects ("everyone knows about the Pythagorean Theorem"), in what areas do you think intelligent people generally have worse information than their "normal" peers?
--John Cutter, The Prestige
The context in the movie is a bit different, but it's a nice illustration of how people can let themselves be seduced by mysterious answers to mysterious questions, even when they purport to be "looking for the answer."
--Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
I think there's more to it than that. To label an opinion heresy is to claim that it deviates from the majority opinion, whether or not that is actually the case.
Sort of related: The Bolsheviks were clever to call themselves Bolsheviks; the Mensheviks probably outnumbered them at the time of the split, but failed to contest the nomenclature.
I think that's part of the meaning of "private opinion" in the quote. If someone agrees with the majority, they don't have their own private opinion.
The Bolsheviks had a majority at the party congress where the split occurred. The Mensheviks were a loosely organized group of study circles. They included all sorts of "members" who weren't actually active. They might have more members, but the defined "members" differently, and that definition was in fact the main basis for the original split with the Mensheviks.
--Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
-- Steven Kaas
Dindo Capello, as quoted in Truth in 24 (2009 film).
-- .Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1891) (paraphrased)
--Razib Khan, here
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions
Arthur Schopenhauer, Counsels and Maxims
I write only when inspiration strikes. Fortunately it strikes every morning at nine o'clock sharp.
-- W. Somerset Maugham
Ohh man, that would be convenient... Actually, given my current schedule, it'd be pretty irritating. I'd spend my mornings sitting in class, fuming that I couldn't just leave and go write all day.
I think what he meant is sit down and get to work on a regular schedule, "inspired" or not. c.f. this.
-a kid named Noah. (Hat-tip to Yvain.)
Original post.
It was found stuck underneath a metal bench at an elementary school bus stop.
Where did you read that he was five?
I definitely wasn't that literate as a five year old.
Fixed.
— Arkady and Boris Strugatsky
Scott Aaronson
Mencius Moldbug
Everything after "If so - definitely, keep it. If not..." is (a) context-dependent and (b) debatable.
-Vi Hart, Doodling in Math: Spirals, Fibonacci, and Being a Plant- Part 3 of 3
John Leslie, The End of the World, p. 242 (paperback)
(He is not talking about about trials in the "randomized controlled trial" sense but rather in the sampling sense.)
Alison Sudol (singer/composer) The Minnow and the Trout
So? We're also 'starstuff'.
-Bengali proverb
I've heard a theory that half truths told with intent to deceive are more damaging than outright lies because if someone is deceived, they're more likely to blame themselves.
Also, you're more likely to notice that an outright lie is false.
Richard Feynman, in Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman, chapter entitled "Mixing Paints".
-Greg Egan, Distress
Leonardo da Vinci
– Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy p. 98
Bertie is a goldmine of rationality quotes.
Also don't confuse "logically coherent" with "true".
You keep saying things I was gonna say. Dost thou haveth a blog perchance?
Thanks. Sorry, I don't have a blog.
Downvoted for incorrect subject-verb agreement.
It was purposeful. It's like "can i haz cheezburger?" but olde schoole.
I don't believe you.
Really? There's precedent in my other comments. Massacring grammar is a compulsion I indulge in when I don't want to be seen as unreservedly endorsing something, in this case Eugine_Nier's comments.
E.g. I sent this to Vladimir_M in a private message:
You can't get ye flask.
Un-downvoted. Sorry.
But it's "i can haz cheesburger?" btw. ;)
That's a little much even for me, and I know what you're talking about.
Edit: Ok, so apparently people think it actually is important to phrase it "hast thou a blog". Shows what I know.
I would think it should be "Dost thou havest a blog?"
I'm voting for "Hast thou a blog?" if one wants to use period English, but I'm going by feel. Does anyone actually know?
May I suggest looking in period literature? If I Google Books "Hast thou a ", I see in the first page of results hits from John Bunyan, 1678-1684 and William Shakespeare, c. 1591, among lesser lights.
Good point. Googling "Dost thou havest a " turns up two results, one of which is Eliezer's comment.
On the other hand, my instincts aren't perfect. I'd have bet that "havest" wasn't a word, but it is. "Hast" is a contraction of "havest".
I was wondering whether the problem was that "dost havest" is redundant, but "havest thou a" doesn't turn up anything period.
Yeah, “dost thou havest” would be much like “does he has”...
-- Nicholas Gurewitch (creator of Perry Bible Fellowship)
The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections; whence proceed sciences which may be called "sciences as one would." For what a man had rather were true he more readily believes. Therefore he rejects difficult things from impatience of research; sober things, because they narrow hope; the deeper things of nature, from superstition; the light of experience, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to be occupied with things mean and transitory; things not commonly believed, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar. Numberless, in short, are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections color and infect the understanding.
-- Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (Aphorism XLIX), 1620. (1863 translation by Spedding, Ellis and Heath. You should read the whole thing, it's all this good.)
Joel Stickley, How To Write Badly Well
Are there useful generalizations which can be derived from this?
"Shut up and multiply" works for practical purposes too.
(One of my favorite shut-up-and-multiply results: automatic dishwashers cost less than 2 euro per hour saved, so everyone should have one.)
Dishwasher efficacy is variable. Where I live, the water is actually hard enough that I have to hand scrub most of the dishes I use because the dishwasher alone won't clean them properly. It only barely takes me less time to get many of my dishes dishwasher-ready than to clean them entirely by hand
I live on a fixed income, so hourly wage isn't a very relevant metric. It wouldn't even fit in my place. I couldn't take it with me when I move, and I move a lot.
Would even this [source] be too large? It's only ~50lbs (~22 kg), so moving it should be possible. (This is not an endorsement of the specific machine or this class of machines, I didn't look very closely.)
I can't sell an extra hour either, but reverse the situation: would you be willing to wash dishes for an hour for $2? (If so, I have a few jobs for you that are harder to automate than dishwashing... ;-))
I've lived in apartments where this would not fit. And I don't think I know anyone who, after finishing dinner, would actually go and earn money during the time they used to spend washing up.
You're assuming away a lot of individual variation in time spent manually washing dishes.
Everyone in the western world you mean ? Because 2 euros per hour is much more than the minimal wage in many countries. Sorry for nit-picking but forgetting that more than half of the world doesn't live in as much comfort as we do is a frequent bias (probably a consequence of availability bias, we don't see them as often).
True, but "everyone on LW" seems to be fairly defensible.
If you download a LOT of old movies onto your PC, a truck full of old tapes heading towards you, could be a great internet speed up from your perspective.
Or a pizza delivering man, he could bring you some files in less time than the email.
At least in principle, some "station wagons full of tapes", cargo planes in the sky full of USB flash drives and pedestrians running on the streets with a massive data storage devices in their bags - they all together could increase the network bandwidth we need.
Tony Dye
From your link:
"Bit meters per second" or "megabyte kilometers per hour" would be a better measure than just "bits per second".
A few from M:TG flavour text.
When nothing remains, everything is equally possible. ~One with Nothing
"Believe in the ideal, not the idol." -Serra ~Worship
"War glides on the simplest updrafts while peace struggles against hurricane winds. It is the way of the world. It must change." ~Commander Eesha
I must admit that one of my favorite quotes from M:tG is one of the less rational ones:
-- Sizzle
-- Fodder Cannon
The card art of Browse gives this gem, which I think I may have posted before:
But the best flavor text ever is still Martyrs' Tomb.
I don't know, I find the Wall of Vapor quote inspirational, as well:
From Shattered Perception (Discard all the cards in your hand, then draw that many cards.):
I think this one takes the cake, in terms of rationality.
To a large extent it already has. Humans are much more peaceful now than they have been in the past. This is part of a large set of broad trends. See Pinker's excellent "The Better Angels of Our Nature". At this point, I'm not sure this quote is really accurate.
True in the sense that 0=0.
I understood it as advocating a maximum ignorance prior. In hindsight, it's an MT:G card, so probably not.
Incidentally, the card itself is notorious for being among the most useless cards ever printed and routinely shows up on "worst card ever" lists.
Also I don't recommend throwing out what you know to have a maximum ignorance prior.
When learning, you must know how to make the clear distinction between what is ideology and what is genuine knowledge.
There is no such thing as good and evil. There is what is right and what is bad, what is consistent and what is wrong.
-- "Behaviour Guide (in order to avoid mere survival)", Jean Touitou
I like the first line.
The second line, though... what on Earth is the difference between "good" and "right" or between "evil" and "bad"? They mean the same thing; "good" and "evil" have just migrated to slightly higher-brow-sounding language.
I'm not trying to defend the quote, but there are no evil microscopes. There are useful microscopes and not useful microscopes.
I'm confused why the original quote contrasts right with bad, rather than with evil, but I think that's what Touitou is trying to say.
Are these two different quotes, or were they juxtaposed like this in the original? (i.e. "You must distinguish between ideology and knowledge. -> There is no such thing as good and evil.")