I noticed an obvious fallacy in the linked argument:
If infinite person-years possible, life extension is amoral.
What? Surely if infinite person-years are possible, it's better for everyone to be immortal than only some, so life extension would be morally preferable, not morally neutral.
Also, why are we assuming the number of person-years lived is independent of the average lifespan? All he exhibited was an upper bound independent of the average lifespan, which is not at all the same thing. If you can't justify the hypothesis that lifespan is a zero-sum game, the entire argument falls apart.
If infinite person years, then (so long as life is net positive) we have infinite utility, and I can't see obviously whether doling this out to a 'smaller' or 'larger' set of people (although both will have same cardinality) will matter. But anyway, I don't think anyone really thinks we can wring infinite amounts of life out of the universe.
Total life-time will have some upper bound. So in worlds where we are efficiently filling up lifespan, the choice is between more short-lived people or fewer long-lived people. In the real world for the foreseeable futu...
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.