Rationality Quotes March 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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-- Terry Goodkind, Faith of the fallen. I know quite a few here dislike the author, but there's still a lot of good material, like this one, or the Wizard Rules.
"Do you believe in revolution
Do you believe that everything will change
Policemen to people
And rats to pretty women
Do you think they will remake
Barracks to bar-rooms
Yperit to Coca-Cola
And truncheons to guitars?
Oh-oh, my naive
It will never be like that
Oh-oh, my naive
Life is like it is
Do you think that ever
Inferiority complexes will change to smiles
Petržalka to Manhattan
And dirty factories to hotels
Do you think they will elevate
Your idols to gods
That you will never have to
Bathe your sorrow with alcohol?
Oh-oh, my naive...
Do you think that suddenly
Everyone will reconcile with everyone
That no one will write you off
If you will have holes in your jeans
Do you think that in everything
Everyone will help you
That you will never have to be
Afraid of a higher power?
Oh-oh, my naive..."
My translation of a Slovak punk-rock song in 1990s "Slobodná Európa: Nikdy to tak nebude". Is it an example of an outside view, or just trying to reverse stupidity?
-- the character Sherkaner Underhill, from A Fire Upon the Deep, by Vernor Vinge.
If people believe traditions are valuable, they should anticipate that searching the past for more traditions is valuable. But we don't see that; we see most past traditions (paradoxically!) rejected with "things are different now".
1 Corinthians 15:54-57
(I like this quote, as long as it's shamelessly presented without context of the last line: "But thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." )
-- G.B. Shaw, "Man and Superman"
Shaw evinces a really weird, teleological view of evolution in that play, but in doing so expresses some remarkable and remarkably early (1903) transhumanist sentiments.
Scott Adams
Do the same with a Chiropractor and let me know if you get different results.
-David Wong
Can one say "I've never gotten that form of help?" And does "I think that help will hurt you in the long run" fall under "I think you're lying about needing help"?
Why did this quote get down-voted by at least two people? I thought it was much, much better than the other quote I posted this month, which is currently sitting pretty at 32 karma despite not adding anything we didn't already know from the Human's Guide to Words sequence.
I upvoted it. The main point is sound as a point of plain logic. However I suspect it isn't quite clear enough and so prone to pattern matching to various political ideologies.
Although not directly contradictory, the idea expressed in the quote is somewhat at odds with libertarianism, which is popular on LW.
Is this true? I mean, isn't that universally recognized as a mind killer?, just like most other political philosophies?
Are there any demographical studies of LW's composition in personspace?
Well, it's true and it's false.
It's popular "on" LW in the sense that many of the people here identify as libertarians.
It's not popular "on" LW, in the sense that discussions of libertarianism are mostly unwelcome.
And, yes, the same is true of many other political philosophies.
The closest things we have to those are probably the mid-2009 and late 2011 surveys. People could fill in their age, gender, race, profession, a few other things, and...politics!
The politics question had some default categories people could choose: libertarian, liberal, socialist, conservative & Communist. In 2009, 45% ticked the libertarian box, and in 2011, 32% (among the people who gave easy-to-categorize answers). Although those obviously aren't majorities, libertarianism is relatively popular here.
Political philosophies are like philosophies in general, I think. However mind-killy they are, a person can't really avoid having one; if they believe they don't have one, they usually have one they just don't know about.
-Captain Kirk
Nonsense. I just threw Schrodinger's cat outside the future light cone. In your Everett branch is the cat alive or dead?
Ok, sure, having a physics where faster than light and even (direct) time travel are possible makes things easier.
Both?
No.
--Dara O'Briain
Friedrich Nietzsche
I don't think that is a good description of what people mean by "faith".
For a better idea of the concept of faith start here.
Except that faith has little to nothing to do with social obligations. Faith is believing something without proof or even reason to believe it.
Unless you mean "faith" as in being "faithful" to your spouse, in which case, that's not even the same thing as what Nietzsche is talking about.
The problem is that Nietzsche was confused about what religious people mean by "faith", as a result his argument is essentially a straw-man.
What religious people mean by "faith" and what faith actually is do not have to be the same thing.
Also, Nietzsche was definitely not confused about what religious people mean by faith. You're just confused because that quote isn't a statement about what faith is, but rather, a statement about the psychology of the faithful.
As for the psychology of faith, to use your example of being faithful to you spouse, you want your spouse not to cheat on you. Thus this is a game of prisoner's dilemma or at least stag hunt, faith amounts to the Timeless Decision Theory solution which requires the belief that your spouse won't cheat on you if you don't cheat on her. Because there is no direct causal relationship between these two events it sounds a lot like believing without proof, especially if one doesn't know enough game theory to understand accusal relationships.
You seem to be missing the point. "Faith" in terms of religious belief is not the same thing as being "faithful" to your spouse.
You're equivocating. Also, that's not a Prisoner's Dilemma. A Prisoner's Dilemma allows no precommittments(you don't expect to get arrested; neither does your partner), and no communication with your partner once the game starts. It's clear that neither of those requirements is true when considering fidelity to one's partner. Relationships are not Prisoner's Dilemma situations. It takes an extreme stretch of the situation, and a skewed placement of values for BOTH players for it to resemble one. If both players can gain more utility from being unfaithful, why not implement an open relationship? If the utility from being unfaithful is high enough(higher than the utility of the relationship itself), why continue the relationship?
Loyalty to one's partner differs in many many many ways from religious faith.
No, this has been standard usage since at least as far back as the High Middle Ages.
That has to be the worst citation in support of an argument I've ever seen. "Standard usage"...is number 6 on a list of different models of faith in philosophical terms? Right. That's clearly what most people mean when they talk about faith.
Also, trusting someone else is the opposite of fidelity to that person, not the same thing.
Regardless, the definition Nietzsche is using is obviously not referring to a trust-based model.
Let me be the first to welcome you, since it appears this is your first day on the Internet.
I wasn't aware of the context in which your back-and-forth with Eugine_Nier was taking place, since I only started reading at this comment when it was in the recent comments feed. My bad. I assumed you thought he was using "faith" in an idiosyncratic way, rather than in a way that has been part of theology for almost a millennium. After reading a few comments up I can see that you were referring to a particular quote by Nietzsche (one in which he probably did not mean to refer to the concept of faith as trust).
Obviously, "trusting someone" is not the same as "fidelity to that person". I never claimed otherwise. On the other hand, opposite is way too strong a word for this. Moreover, Eugine_Nier's comment never made such an equivalence claim. He said that "faith amounts" to the "belief that your spouse won't cheat on you". This sounds very much like the concept of faith as trust (and not its opposite).
We are in full agreement on this point.
It is a usage of the same original word that has clearly diverged such that to substitute the intended meaning across contexts is most decidedly equivocation. "Faith" as in a kind of belief is not the same meaning as "faithful" as in not fucking other people. This should be obvious. The origin of the (nearly euphemistic) usage of the term is beside the point.
Except for, well, being one in most social circumstances and for certain beliefs.
Let me restate: social obligations are not at the core of what faith is. One could believe something without proof if she were alone in the universe. Faith certainly can be a social obligation, and depending upon what it is faith in, could easily necessitate social obligations, but the general idea of "believing in something without evidence" can be done by one person alone, and social obligations are by no means part of that definition.
It's not what people intend "faith" to mean, but nevertheless it often ends up being its effective definition. (EDIT: To clarify, by "it" I am referring to Nietzsche's definition.)
--George F. Stigler, "Economics or Ethics?"
--Gregory House, M.D. - S02E11 "Need to Know"
Thought it was a duplicate of this superior quote, but it wasn't.
Though I don't remember who said it.
-William Hazlitt, attacking phrenology.
This quote is itself an example of the phenomenon it describes since it stems from a desire to be able to separate true from false science without the hard and messy process of looking at the territory.
Also hindsight bias.
I don't see that in the quote - it seems to be an attempted explanation for the existence of pseudoscience, not a heuristic for identifying such.
The problem is that it's still false. A lot of false science was developed by people honestly trying to find true causes. I also suspect that a good deal of actual science was developed by people who accepted a cause without enough evidence out of a desire to have a cause for everything and got lucky.
Politics is the art of the possible. Sometimes I’m tempted to say that political philosophy is the science of the impossible.
John Holbo
-Charles Dodgeson(Lewis Carrol), Through the Looking Glass
Isn't Humpty Dumpty wrong, if the goal is intelligible conversation?
-- Hans Moravec Time Travel and Computing
--Benjamin Vigoda, "Analog Logic: Continuous-Time Analog Circuits for Statistical Signal Processing" (2003 PhD thesis)
Thomas Henry Huxley - about Darwin's theory of evolution
Meh. That's just hindsight bias.
Galileo Galilei (translated by me)
Generally, yes. But in this particular casa we can trust, that the later Darwin's bulldog really felt that way and that this was a justified statement. He obviously understood the matter well.
All those English animal breeders had a good insight. It was more or less a wild generalization for them. Non so wild for Huxley.
Friedrich Nietzsche, foreseeing the CEV-problem? (Just kidding, of course)
If a sufficient number of people who wanted to stop war really did gather together, they would first of all begin by making war upon those who disagreed with them. And it is still more certain that they would make war on people who also want to stop wars but in another way. -G.I. Gurdjieff
--Gregory Cochran, in a comment here
Also good, from that comment's OP:
Razib Khan
This has 6 karma points, so I'm left curious about whether people have anything in mind about what real intellectuals shouldn't know.
I could be interpreting it entirely wrong, but I'd guess this is the list Cochran had in mind:
•
Real intellectuals shouldn't know things that science doesn't know.
My immediate thought was a 'real intellectual' shouldn't fill their brain with random useless information, (e.g. spend their time reading tvtropes).
Real intellectuals shouldn't know the details of fictional worlds. They shouldn't know the private business of their neighbors. They shouldn't know more about sports than is necessary for casual conversation on the matter (though no less either). They shouldn't know how to lie, how to manipulate people, they shouldn't know much about how to make money, they shouldn't know much about concrete political affairs unless that is their business. They shouldn't know too much about food or the maintenance of their health.
Real intellectuals should be able to play an instrument, but not very well. They shouldn't know too much about crimes, mental disorders, disasters, diseases, or wars. They should know the broad strokes of history, but not the details unless that is their primary business.
Real intellectuals should enjoy music, but never study it, unless that is their primary business. Most essentially, real intellectuals shouldn't know what they don't have the time or inclination to know well.
Ksawery Tartakower
--George Orwell, here
Since I have just read that "the intelligentsia" is usually now used to refer to artists etc. and doesn't often include scientists, this isn't as bad as I first thought; but still, it seems pretty silly to me - trying to appear deep by turning our expectations on their head. A common trick, and sometimes it can be used to make a good point... but what's the point being made here? Ordinary people are more rational than those engaged in intellectual pursuits? I doubt that, though rationality is in short supply in either category; but in any case, we know the "ordinary man" is extremely foolish in his beliefs.
Folk wisdom and common sense are a favored refuge of those who like to mock those foolish, Godless int'lectual types, and that's what this reminds me of; you know, the entirely too-common trope of the supposedly intelligent scientist or other educated person being shown up by the homespun wisdom and plain sense of Joe Ordinary. (Not to accuse Orwell of being anti-intellectual in general - I just don't like this particular quote.)
This quote isn't just about seeming deep, it refers to a frequently observed phenomenon. I think two main reasons for it are that intellectuals are better at rationalizing beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons (there is even a theory that some intellectuals signal their intelligence by rationalizing absurd beliefs) and the fact that they're frequently in ivory towers where day to day reality is less available.
Depends on which type of anti-intellectualism you're referring to.
I remember Tetlock's Expert Political Judgment suggested a different mechanism for intelligence to be self-defeating: clever arguing. In a forecaster's field of expertise, they have more material with which to justify unreasonable positions and refute reasonable ones, and therefore they are more able to resist the force of reality.
Related to Schelling fences on slippery slopes:
— Thomas De Quincey
I don't get this quote, it strikes me as wit with no substance.
Me too, honestly.
Presumably the quote is from De Quincey's essay "On Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts", and with that context & perspective in mind it has a tad more substance.
-Douglas Adams
Tauriq Moosa
Sam Hughes, talking about the first season finale of Doctor Who, differentiating between the subjective feeling of certainty and the actual probability estimate.
On our kind not cooperating:
Michelle Obama
-Douglas Adams
― Cory Doctorow, For The Win
I interpret this to mean that often times questions are overlooked because the possibility of them being true seems absurd. Similar to the Sherlock Holmes saying, “When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
I interpret it to mean that Cory Doctorow doesn't fully consider the implications of hindsight bias when it comes to predicting the merits of asking questions from a given class.
Usually asking stupid questions really is just stupid.
But the expected return on asking a stupid question is still positive.
Asking stupid questions costs status.
And this sort of thing is why some of us think all this 'status' talk is harmful.
It doesn't go away if you stop talking about it.
Personally, I think Robin Hanson tends to treat status as a hammer that turns all issues into nails; it's certainly possible to overuse a perspective for analyzing social interaction. But that doesn't mean that there aren't cases where you can only get a meaningful picture of social actions by taking it into consideration.
No, but worrying about status can keep you from getting answers to your 'stupid' questions.
This is partly why nerds have largely internalized the "there are no stupid questions" rule. See Obvious Answers to Simple Questions by isaacs of npm fame.
Nowadays, I can ask a question of the entire WEIRD world without losing any status. There are still some that just aren't worth wasting my time on. For example: Is the moon actually a moose?
From a slightly different perspective we could say that asking 'silly' questions (even good silly questions) costs status while asking stupid questions can potentially gain status in those cases where the people who hear you ask are themselves stupid (or otherwise incentivised to appreciate a given stupid gesture).
No, not with even the slightest semblance of opportunity cost being taken into account.
I'd say there are probably cases where people have gotten hurt by not asking "stupid" questions.
Also, I think we need to dissolve what exactly a stupid question is?
Hrm. Okay, I see your point, I think. I think there's some benefit in devoting a small portion of your efforts to pursuing outlying hypotheses. Probably proportional to the chance of them being true, I guess, depending on how divisible the resources are. If by "stupid", Doctorow means "basic", he might be talking about overlooked issues everyone assumed had already been addressed. But I guess probabilistically that's the same thing - its unlikely after a certain amount of effort that basic issues haven't been addressed, so its an outlying hypothesis, and should again get approximately as much attention as its likelihood of being true, depending on resources and how neatly they can be divided up. And maybe let the unlikely things bubble up in importance if the previously-thought-more-likely things shrink due to apparently conflicting evidence... A glaring example to me seems the abrahamic god's nonexplanatory abilities going unquestioned for as long as they did. Like, treating god as a box to throw unexplained things in and then hiding god behind "mysteriousness" begs the question of why there's a god clouded in mysteriousness hanging around.
-- Tim Minchin, Storm
That could just mean we're no good at solving mysteries that involve magic.
Also, I think there is a selection effect in so far as there are solved mysteries where the solution was magic; however, you'd probably argue that they were not solved correctly using no other evidence than that the solutions involved magic.
-- Niels Henrik Abel, on how he developed his mathematical ability.
The Princess Bride:
Man in Black: Inhale this, but do not touch.
Vizzini: [sniffs] I smell nothing.
Man in Black: What you do not smell is called iocane powder. It is odorless, tasteless, dissolves instantly in liquid, and is among the more deadlier poisons known to man.
[He puts the goblets behind his back and puts the poison into one of the goblets, then sets them down in front of him]
Man in Black: All right. Where is the poison? The battle of wits has begun. It ends when you decide and we both drink, and find out who is right... and who is dead.
[Vizzini stalls, then eventually chooses the glass in front of the man in black. They both drink, and Vizzini dies.]
Buttercup: And to think, all that time it was your cup that was poisoned.
Man in Black: They were both poisoned. I spent the last few years building up an immunity to iocane powder.
Ayn Rand
Making the (flawed) assumption that in a disagreement, they cannot both be wrong.
Also, they could be wrong about whether they actually disagree.
-- Reg Braithwaite (raganwald)
Winston Churchill
Steven Kaas
--Matt Yglesias
I found that very poignant, but I'm not sure I agree with his final claim. I think he's committing the usual mistake of claiming impossible what seems hard.
--Alain de Botton
Wendy Braitman
On the mind projection fallacy:
-John Stuart Mill
Every subjective feeling IS at least one thing - a bunch of neurons firing. Whether stored representational content activated in that firing has any connection to events represented happening outside the brain is another question.
-Seth Godin
A. I'm not entirely sure that things that used to be human nature no longer are. We deal with them, surpress them, sublimate, etc. Anger responses, fear, lust, possesiveness, nesting. The animal instincts of the human animal. How those manifest does indeed change, but not the "nature" of them.
B. We live (in the USA) in a long-term culture of anti-intellectualism. Obviously this doesn't mean it can't change... Sometimes it seems like it will (remember the days before nerd-chic?), but in a nominally democratic society, there will always be a minority of people who are relatively "intellectual" by definition, we should recognize that you don't have to overcome anti-intellectualism, you just have to raise the bar. While still anti-intellectual, in many ways even the intentionally uninformed know more than the average person did back in the day. (just like there will always be a minority of people who will be "relatively tall", even as the average height has tended to increased over the generations)
HULK EXPLAINS WHY WE SHOULD STOP IT WITH THE HERO JOURNEY SHIT
Naturally not. Harry would only do something that reckless if it was to save a general of the Dark Lord on the whim of his mentor. ;)
I of course agree with thatguy, with substitution of 'the most viable immediate' in there somewhere. It is a solution to all sorts of things.
If Eliezer Yudkowsky, the author, is lauding this statement, I think we can rule this out as Harry's solution.
As previously stated, Harry is not a perfect rationalist.
Neither is Eliezer Yudkowsky.
My philosophy is that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that other people notice.
I propose that it's okay to be imperfect, but not so imperfect that reality notices.
This is a cool-sounding slogan that doesn't actually say anything beyond "Winning is good."
No, it says that practical degrees of excellence are just fine and you don't actually have to achieve philosophically perfect excellence to be sufficiently effective.
It's the difference between not being able to solve an NP-complete problem perfectly, and being able to come up with pretty darn close numerical approximations that do the practical job just fine. (I think evolution achieves a lot of the latter, for example.)
I agree with your version, but "not getting caught" as a proxy for "good enough" is, at least to humans, not just wrong but actively misleading.
This variant of when all you have is a hammer is seen often enough to merit a name.
"When all you have is a powered-up Patronus, every problem looks like storming Azkaban is the answer"?
I meant something along the lines of "When your hammer is too darn impressive, everything begins to look like a nail."
I'm also fond of:
Karkat's just full of these gems of almost-wisdom.
Me: "The BOFH stories are just stories and certainly not role models. Ha! Ha! Baseball bat, please."
Boss: "The DNS stuff is driving me batty, but I'm not sure who needs taking into a small room and battering."
Me: "Your past self."
Boss: "Yeah, he was a right twat."
(I was thinking of Karkat, too.)
Found here.
Mencius Moldbug, A gentle introduction to Unqualified Reservations (part 2) (yay reflection!)
-Douglas Adams
-Charlie Munger
I'm surprised by how consistently misinterpreted the EMH is, even by people with the widest possible perspective on markets and economics. The EMH practically requires that some people make money by trading, because that's the mechanism which causes the market to become efficient. The EMH should really be understood to mean that as more and more money is leached out of the market by speculators, prices become better and better approximations to real net present values.
I've always thought of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as the anti-Tinkerbell: if everybody all starts clapping and believing in it, it dies.
See, for example, every bubble ever. "We don't need to worry about buying that thing for more than it seems to be worth, because prices are going up so we can always resell it for even more than that later!"
That's pretty much the thesis of Markets are Anti-Inductive by EY.
If they actually believed the market they were trading in was efficient they wouldn't believe that prices would continue to go up. They would expect them to follow the value of capital invested at that level of risk. Further - as applicable to any bubble that doesn't represent overinvestment in the entire stockmarket over all industries - they wouldn't jump on a given stock or group of stocks more than any other. They would buy random stocks from the market, probably distributed as widely as possible.
No, belief in an efficient market can only be used as a scapegoat here, not as a credible cause.
--Steve Sailer, here
•••
[Taking the lyrics literally, the whole thing is a pretty sweet transhumanist anthem.]
--Diane Duane, High Wizardry
--Alain de Botton
-David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity.
Natalie Wolchover
Adolfo Bioy Casares (my translation)
--SMBC Theater - Death
-Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow
--Joseph de Maistre, Les soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ch. I
Some guilt also falls onto those who are not eager enough to verify those opinions or the money they circulate.
The man on the top (at the beginning) is NOT guilty for everything.
To my way of thinking, it's quite possible for me to be fully responsible for a chain of events (for example, if they would not have occurred if not for my action, and I was aware of the likelihood of them occurring given my action, and no external forces constrained my choice so as to preclude acting differently) and for other people upstream and downstream of me to also be fully responsible for that chain of events. This is no more contradictory than my belief that object A is to the left of object B from one perspective and simultaneously to the right of object A from another. Responsibility is not some mysterious fluid out there in the world that gets portioned out to individuals, it's an attribute that we assign to entities in a mental and/or social model.
You seem to be claiming that models wherein total responsibility for an event is conserved across the entire known causal chain are superior to mental models where it isn't, but I don't quite see why i ought to believe that.
I'm very surprised as to why is this so upvoted, other than the fact that some of the LW crowd really loves 19th century right-wing writers. The statement is patently untrue.
Even in regard to hard-line reactionaries themselves and their political circumstances; did de Maistre think that Voltaire or Rousseau or even Robespierre ever consciously produced "false opinions" to befuddle the masses?
No way; even later conservatives, like Burke and Chesterton, have admitted that if the French Revolution went wrong somewhere (and Chesterton thought it was off to a good start), it must have been a mistake, not a crime.
I don't think it's a very good quote but I'd guess that the majority of readers didn't know/notice/remember he was a 19th century right-wing writer. As such few people would associate this quote with opposition to the French Revolution, or even politics -- people would first think of such things as religions.
And I'd put money on Mohammed, Joseph Smith and Apostle Paul to have been deliberate conmen. (I'm leaving out Jesus, because I'd put odds on him being just delusional)
I know ~nothing about the historical events which you allude to, but I upvoted the quote because experience tells me it's very true in real life. E.g. a journalist writes a news article that contains lies about its subject matter, and the link to the article gets widely shared by honest people who presume that it's telling the truth. Or a dishonest scientist makes up his data, and then gets cited by honest scientists.
Oh. In that case, well, it's true about local "opinions" but false about views on global things. Like the so-called free market (which is mostly not free) or the so-called democracy (which is mostly not ruled by the People): I believe that most nominally educated people today have a pretty reasonable assessment of their value: they kinda work, and even bring some standard of living, but do so very ineffectively. So the only "false opinions" on this scale are just ritual statements semi-consciously produced out of fear of empowering the enemies of the present structure. I might make a great and benevolent dictator, but I can't trust my heir; so I'd rather endorse "democracy" steered by experts. Both the "democracy" and the "free market" are part of what we are, therefore we must defend them vigilantly.
Fortunately, we're leaving such close-mindedness behind. Unfortunately, we might have the illusion of not needing any other abstract concepts to use for our social identity. Humans always do! If we don't believe in Democracy, then we must believe in the Catholic Church, or Fascism, or Moldbuggery, or Communism, or Direct Theocracy (like in Banks' Culture). But believe we will.
This sounds somewhat like the assertion, usually made by religious critics of science, that "everyone believes in something; your faith is in Science" (or Darwin, or the like). Would you care to distinguish these assertions?
-Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World
Robert Heinlein, Stranger In A Strange Land
-- Neil DeGrasse Tyson
I think he'd do better if he just made up his mind. I'd go with the second one.
watch out folks, we got a badass over here
-Michael "Kayin" O'Reilly
Or, as the Language Log puts it:
Swap out "grammar" and "style" for "morality" and "ethics"?
Disagree strongly. What the heck is "evidence" for morality? Unless "emulate X" is one of your values, your ethical system needn't aspire to approximate anything.
It's Language Log, without the, goddammit!
Without the what? That isn't grammatical.
Upvoted under the presumption that you're being ironic.
Why, do you say “Less Wrong”, or “the Less Wrong”?
Without the fnord, of course.
---Tim Ingold, “Clearing the Ground"
"The greatest lesson in life is to know that even fools are sometimes right."
-Winston Churchill
-Morpheus, Deus Ex
Yes, I know, generalization from fictional evidence and the dangers thereof, etc. . . I think it a genuine insight, though. Just remember that humans are (almost) never motivated by just one thing.
Explain for me?
Certainly. The idea is that God was invented not just to explain the world (the standard answer to that question) but also as a sort of model of how a particular group of people wanted to be governed. One of the theses of the game is that governments constitute a system for (attempting to) compensate for the inability of people to rationally govern themselves, and that God is the ultimate realization of that attempt. A perfect government with a perfect understanding of human nature and access to everyone's opinions and desires (but without any actual humans involved). Over time, of course, views of what 'God' should be like shift with the ambient culture.
I agree, with the caveat that humans usually (and probably in this case) do things for multiple complicated reasons rather than just one. Also the caveat that Deus Ex is a video game.
Interesting theory, and perhaps one that's got legs, but there's some self-reinforcement going on in the religious sphere that keeps it from being unicausal -- if we've got a religion whose vision of God (or of a god of rulership like Odin or Jupiter, or of a divine hierarchy) is initially a simple reflection of how its members want to be governed, I'd nonetheless expect that to drift over time to variants which are more memorable or more flattering to adherents or more conducive to ingroup cohesion, not just to those which reflect changing mores of rulership. Then group identity effects will push those changes into adherents' models of proper rulership, and a nice little feedback loop takes shape.
This probably helps explain some of the more blatantly maladaptive aspects of religious law we know about, although I imagine costly signaling plays an important role too.
-- nostrademons on Hacker news
That's a good quote! +1.
Unfortunately, for every rational action, there appears to be an equal and opposite irrational one: did you see bhousel's response?
Sigh.
Said by a pub manager I know to someone who came into his pub selling lucky white heather:
"I'm running a business turning over half a million pounds a year, and you're selling lucky heather door to door. Doesn't seem to work, does it?"
Albert Jay Nock, The Theory of Education in the United States
--Daniel Kahneman in Thinking, Fast and Slow
Chesterton, found here